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THE MANDATORY STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
Jeffrey N. Gordon*
It has become standard in the law and economics literature to refer

to the corporation as a "nexus of contracts." ' On this view, the corporate entity is nothing more than a gathering point for a series of contracts, express and implied, among assorted actors: shareholders,
bondholders, managers, employees, suppliers and customers, for ex-

ample. This view rankles some sensibilities, because the economists'
conception of a "contract" as an arrangement between two or more
actors supported by reciprocal expectations and behavior is far broader
than the lawyer's conception, which focuses on the existence of judicially cognizable duties and obligations. 2 Thus the lawyer, but not the
economist, will pay particularly close attention to the indicia of contract
formation-offer and acceptance, an exchange of promises-ideally re-

flected in an explicit bargaining process. 3 This difference in perspective becomes acute in the case of an "implied" contract. To a lawyer,

an implied contract is one that does not actually exist, but because of
some overriding principle of justice is judicially enforceable nonetheless. 4 To an economist, an implied contract is one that is enforced
* Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. B.A. Yale University, 1971;
J.D., Harvard University, 1975. I am grateful to Bernie BlackJack Coffee, Lewis Kornhauser, Lou Lowenstein, Ricky Revesz, Andy Rutten, Bob Scott, Rod Smith and to participants at law school faculty workshops at the Universities of Chicago, Harvard,
Michigan and at NYU for helpful discussion and for comments on an earlier draft; to
Richard Brook, Beth Goldberg and Ricardo Nunez for research assistance, and to the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund at New York University Law School and the Henley Program in Law and Business at Columbia University
Law School for generous financial support.
1. The concept can be traced to Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 777-78 (1972) (the firm is a
"centralized contractual agent in a team productive process"). The term "nexus of contracts" was coined in Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3J. Fin. Econ. 305, 310-11 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1977) (defining a contract as
"a promise or the set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty"); E. Farnsworth, Contracts, § 1.1 (1982).
3. See Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in Principals and Agents: The
Structure of Business 60-61 (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985) (duties of contract
fixed by voluntary and actual agreement); Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1403, 1405, 1411-20 (1985)
(alleged corporate contracts criticized for lack of "volition and cognition").
4. Lawyers sometimes distinguish between contracts that are "implied in fact" and
those that are "implied in law." "Implied in fact" contracts consist of a legally enforceable exchange of promises, except that the offeree's promise is inferred from her silence
or other conduct. Such contracts are enforced as if the promise had been "express."
Precisely because of this similarity of consequences, Professor Farnsworth regards the
distinction between "express" and "implied in fact" contracts as having no legal signifi-
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through marketplace mechanisms such as reputation effects rather than
in a court, a means of enforcement that may not bring relief to the
aggrieved party but will over time penalize parties who welsh.
The economists have also been divided among themselves in important ways. Much of their work presents a "positive theory of
agency"-that is, an effort to account for the observed features of corporate structure and corporate finance as a way of minimizing the costs
of the separation of ownership and control, "agency costs." 5 This literature develops the idea that these agency problems are foreseen, are
addressed ex ante through efforts to align the incentives of managers
and shareholders, and are priced out. The seller of shares bears the
consequences of agency costs through a lower sale price. A somewhat
different approach, identified as transaction-costs economics, notes that
the contracts comprising the corporation are inevitably incomplete and
focuses on the governance mechanisms the parties establish at the outset to handle the problems that arise subsequently. 6 The transaction7
costs approach is also basically positive.
Lawyers have taken these contractarian analyses one step further
and given them normative force. It is not simply that the corporation is
best described as a nexus of contracts, but that the corporation should be
permitted to function freely in that way. Here, the debate over the
"nexus of contracts" approach is more than terminological, because
two important principles follow from normative contractarianism. The
first principle is that the content of corporate law, which includes both
the statutory law and the common law of fiduciary duty, should ideally
be the results that typical parties to the contract comprising the corpocance. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 2, § 3.15, at 142 n.2. "Implied in law" contracts
refer to instances in which one party has conferred a benefit on another and the conferring party is permitted a recovery to avoid "unjust enrichment" of the other, despite the
lack of promissory exchange. These are frequently described as claims in "quasi-con-

tract." See Schott v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 436 Pa. 279, 290, 259 A.2d 443, 449
(1969); E. Farnsworth, supra note 2, at § 2.20.
5. SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 310;Jensen & Smith, Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory, in Recent Advances in
Corporate Finance 93 (E. Altman & M. Subrahmanyam eds. 1985).
6. For a very useful summary and comparison of these two approaches see
Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. Fin. 567 (1988).

Williamson sees more similarities than differences in the two approaches, but for a lawyer concerned about the role of mandatory legal rules, much turns on the differences
between the ex ante incentive-alignment perspective of positive agency theory and the
incomplete contracting/ex post governance perspective of transaction cost economics,

7. Another difference among economists is that the contractarian approach is used
to address two rather different questions. Instead of corporate finance, structure and
governance, some economists explore the proper boundary of the firm. If firms are just
a set of contracts, why do firms exist? Or, alternatively, why aren't all activities organized within a single firm? See, e.g., Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of
the Firm, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1758-63 (1989); Holmstrom &Tirole, The Theory of
the Firm, in Handbook of Industrial Organization (R. Schmalensee & R. Willig eds.
forthcoming 1989).
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ration would have reached if bargaining were costless. That will reduce
the parties' needs for customized terms and thereby reduce transaction
costs. This is the "content principle." The second principle is that corporate law should function as a sort of standard form contract, an "off
the rack" set of terms that parties may use for their convenience but
may also freely alter. This is the "opt out principle."'8 A traditional
corporate lawyer would be particularly startled by the application of
these principles to fiduciary duties, which are commonly thought to
provide an indispensable backdrop to corporate relationships, including protection against actions permitted by statute but nevertheless inequitable or overreaching. 9
The content principle of normative contractarianism is obviously
controversial. It assumes that the sole purpose of corporate law ought
to be private wealth maximization. 10 It ignores some of the important
history of corporate law, in which states were led to grant the privileges
of incorporation to aid the provision of public services.' I These historical roots may have important carryover implications for state statutory
provisions and common law norms on corporate charitable activity.
Normative contractarianism also ignores the regulatory aims that once
played a large role in state corporate law-for example, the bar on corporate ownership of stock in another corporation, which was intended
to operate as a limit on corporate size and diversityt 2-and the regulatory aims that still may be important, such as efforts to minimize uncompensated third party effects of corporate activity. (For example,
certain rules about board structure and about remedial devices such as
8. The opt out principle depends upon the content principle but does not necessar-

ily follow from it. If corporate law serves goals other than facilitating the parties' optimal bargain, then opting out obviously does not follow. Even if the content principle
held, we might believe that there were defects in the bargaining process that argued
against opting out.
9. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
10. In other words, the content principle assumes that in a realm of contractual
freedom, parties will structure their relationships in a way that maximizes their joint
wealth. The assumption is almost tautologically true if coercion is absent. Ideally private wealth maximization would be only a step on the road to social wealth maximization, but it is not clear whether this is a requirement of normative contractarianism. For
discussion of circumstances in which private wealth maximization may conflict with the
more familiar corporate law criterion of shareholder wealth maximization, see infra note
79.
11. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting);
M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 111-14 (1977); J.
Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States
1780-1970, 17 (1970). But see Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition
in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14J. Legal Stud. 129 (1985) (special chartering
depicted as part of rent-seeking theory of legislative action in which private parties compete for legislative favors and legislators try to extract the maximum possible rents,
through lobbying, logrolling, and even bribery).
12. See Liggett, 288 U.S. at 556 n.32.
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the shareholder derivative suit could be regarded as regulatory efforts
to force the corporation to internalize the cost of law compliance.)
In light of the competition among states for incorporations, however, private wealth maximization is likely to be the shaping force of
corporate law. If shareholders and managers perceive that a state's corporate law does not operate in their joint interest, they can simply
move elsewhere.' 3 This is not to deny the importance of regulatory
objectives, but to suggest that corporate law will tend to squeeze out
those interests. Regulatory objectives will be easier to achieve through
federal rules or quasi-federal rules (such as the rules of the stock exchanges) that are commonly thought outside the scope of corporate
law. 14

Once the content principle, and its focus on private wealth max13. This does not mean that every particular element of state corporation law will
be private wealth maximizing. Because state law comes as a package, corporations may
decide to locate in a state with some undesirable (from the private wealth perspective)
corporate law features, if the package is better than what other states offer. Nevertheless, particular laws may have such large impact that the private wealth maximizing criterion operates directly on them. An interesting small example is the recent campaign to
repeal New York Business Corporation Law § 630, which provides that the ten largest
shareholders of a New York corporation that is not publicly traded are personally liable
for employee claims that the corporation cannot satisfy. A major part of the campaign
pitch is that small businesses have incorporated or will incorporate in other states to
avoid the law. See Letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Corporation Law, to the New York State Senate Committee on Corporations,
Authorities, and Commissioners (Apr. 7, 1988). A similar argument was successful in
earlier amendment, of the statute, which added the exception for publicly traded corporations. See Comment, Shareholder Liability for Wages: Section 630 of the New York
Business Corporation Law, 30 Fordham L. Rev. 471, 474-75 (1962).
Conceivably a state could try to impose its corporate law on foreign corporations
doing business in the state without fear that the corporations would forego economic
opportunity in the state. For a discussion of some of the problems in such a strategy, see
Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 Cornell L.Q 599
(1965).
14. The role played by the competition among states in the shaping of corporate
law sheds some light on a threshold question: what is the scope of "corporate law"?
Corporations, as important social actors, are subject to a wide range of laws, some of
which are addressed to activities of any "person," such as many environmental laws, and
others of which may be addressed to corporations specifically, for example, the federal
restrictions on corporate campaign contributions. For present purposes, "corporate
law" refers to the set of state corporation statutes and common law fiduciary duties
which take up the internal governance of the corporation and which today are concerned
principally with the relations between the corporation's managers (broadly understood)
and its suppliers of capital, particularly shareholders, and those suppliers inter se. This
is a distinctive domain precisely because the decision as to the state of incorporation
gives corporations a great deal of discretion in selecting the set of statutes and duties to
which it will subject itself, while not affecting any other location or production decisions.
Note that "corporate law" so understood does not exhaust the legal treatment of
relations between a corporation and its capital suppliers, which are addressed somewhat
differently in the federal securities laws, nor does "corporate law" address the concerns
of others who might have contractual relations with the corporation, for example, employees and customers, who look to federal and state labor and consumer protection
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imization, is accepted, then the opt out principle seems a natural follow-on. Even if corporate law accurately embodies the private
maximizing bargain for typical parties, the actual parties may be atypical in important respects. If so, the parties will be better off in a regime
where they can customize terms rather than one where "one size fits
all." Put otherwise, they are better off having more rather than fewer
choices, and the ability to alter the standard form arrangement provides more choices. This view is the "expanded choice postulate."' 5
Yet corporate law, as it stands today, has not fully embraced the
model of unrestrained opting out. Much of corporate law is certainly
flexible, in the sense that the parties can opt out of many statutory default positions. For example, the phrase "unless otherwise provided in
the certificate of incorporation" runs through the famously flexible Delaware code like a leitmotif. Nevertheless, many features of corporate
law, great and small, are mandatory. Even Delaware provides a striking
number of mandatory norms. 16
laws, respectively. As a normative claim, this limitation of the reach of corporate law is
undoubtedly controversial, but probably not as a positive claim.
The recent amendment of several state corporation laws to broaden the scope of
the board's permissible business judgment consideration of a hostile takeover bid to
include employee and community concerns is consistent with this claim. E.g., Ind. Code
Ann. § 23-1-35-1 (Burns Supp. 1988); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1988);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351,347
(Vernon Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 717(b) (McKinney Legis. Serv. 1989);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.59(e) (Baldwin Supp. 1988); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.305 (West Supp. 1988). The
political circumstances under which these statutes were typically adopted-managerialist
promotion of antitakeover weapons, see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text-and
the discretion typically given the board to ignore nonshareholder interests altogether
make it unlikely that these laws intend or portend an expansion of the goals of corporate
law.
15. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 262
(1985). Another argument for the opt out principle is the protection it gives the parties
against erosion of the content premise by a legislative process that tries to smuggle
regulatory goals into corporate law or which does not adapt quickly enough to changing
circumstances.
16. Here is a partial list of mandatory provisions in the Delaware Code: Stockholders elect directors annually, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988), and
have the right to vote by proxy, id. § 212(b). Although the board may be classified, the
number of classes is limited to three and no director's term can be longer than three
years, id. § 141(d). The board may establish committees to act in lieu of the whole
board but the delegation may not include decisions with respect to amendment of the
articles of the bylaws or actions with respect to mergers or the sale of substantially all
assets, id. § 14 1(c). (For an interesting histbrical account of the "mandatory" role of the
board, see Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate
Anachronism, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 696 (1960)). Payout of dividends is limited by a statutory formula, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 170, and directors are personally liable for negligence in making wrongful dividend payments, stock purchases, or redemptions, id.
§§ 173, 174. Shareholders are required to make a proper demand on the board before
instituting a derivative action, Del. Ct. Ch. R. 23. 1.Amendment of the articles of incor-
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Why should these or any other features of corporate law be
mandatory? Why shouldn't every provision be qualified by the phrase
"unless otherwise provided in the charter"? Two contrary explanations
for the existence of mandatory terms are immediately obvious: First, it
may be that contractarianism is not an adequate account of corporate
law, and that despite contractarian strands, large chunks of corporate
law continue to serve goals other than private wealth maximization. Alternatively, we may be witnessing an evolutionary process in midstream
so that, although the inexorable trend is toward contractarianism, vestigial mandatory elements remain.
This Article pursues a third explanation: that it is a mistake to assume that full contractual freedom in corporate law would necessarily
lead to private wealth maximization. The existence of some mandatory
rules may lead to better contracts. In other words, the mixed system of
optional and mandatory legal rules that we observe may be best even
from an essentially contractarian perspective.1 7 The Article basically
poration of a stock corporation requires a majority shareholder vote, Del. Code Ann. tit.
8, § 242(b)(1) (1983 & Supp. 1988). A class of stock whose rights and preferences
would be altered adversely by the amendment is entitled to a class vote on the amendment, even if the class is otherwise nonvoting, id. § 242(b)(2). Shareholders must vote
on certain mergers and the sale of substantially all assets of the corporation, id, § 251 (c).
In certain mergers shareholders are entitled to a judicial "appraisal" of the fair value of
their shares as an alternative to accepting the consideration provided by the merger
agreement, id. § 262. Written notice for a shareholders' meeting must be provided in a
window of not more than 60 days before the meeting and not less than 10 days before
the meeting, id. § 222(a), (b). Shareholders have a right to inspect a shareholders list
and the corporation's books and records, id. §§ 219, 220. Shareholders can remove
directors even without cause except in the case of cumulative voting or a classified
board, id. § 141(k). Restrictions on the sale of stock are ineffective against shareholders
not party to the vote or agreement who bought before the restrictions were enacted, id.
§ 202(b). And, on the fiduciary duty front, directors' actions are subject to a shareholders' derivative suit for breach of the duty of loyalty, see id. § 102(b)(7).
Professor Romano argues that these provisions are not really mandatory because
they can be circumvented and thus lack bite. Romano, Answering the Wrong Question:
The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1599-1601
(1989). For example, she challenges the potency of rules against a self-perpetuating
board in light of entrenchment devices such as dual class common stock and management control over the nominating process. But under the present regime no board is
immune from a sale of a control block of voting stock or disaffection by inside shareholders. Even in cases of greatest stability, mandatory election requirements exert their
influence. Another provision she challenges, the prohibition of delegation of merger
decisions to a board committee, is the basis for the court's reference to outside directors, of which she approves. If delegation were permitted, then presumably the court
would have no ground to insist on the whole board's consideration, particularly consideration by the outside directors (who probably would not be assigned to the committee).
The argument that "mandatory" law has no bite is elaborated in Black, Is Corporate
Law Trivial?: A Political And Economic Analysis, (forthcoming 84 Nw. U.L. Rev.
(1990)).
17. Even if a mixed system is private wealth maximizing, those who view contractarianism from a libertarian perspective would object to the inclusion of mandatory
rules. SeeJ. Coleman, Markets, Morals, and the Law 115-16 (1988).
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presents a positive account rather than a normative one, although it
may offer some guidance to a legislator faced with a proposed change
to the state corporation law. In particular, the account suggests that
where important changes in the relationship between shareholders and
management are at issue, legislation that relaxes mandatory rules
should always require an affirmative shareholder decision to "opt in" to
the change rather than merely permitting shareholders to "opt out."
This will prevent management from extracting more from the legislative process than it could obtain from the charter amendment process.
The account also may have important implications for the recent debates over optional fiduciary duty rules as now permitted by statute in
Delaware' 8 and as proposed as a matter of common law by the American Law Institute Reporters,1 9 and also over the proposal that firms be
20
permitted to opt out of certain Williams Act protections.
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I presents and assesses several hypotheses that would justify the superiority of a mixed system.
Part II evaluates certain mandatory rules along the criteria that have
been developed in Part I and considers two related arguments: first,
that a restricted set of "nonconstitutive" mandatory rules-including,
for example, an appraisal remedy providing exit for disaffected investors-would be an inadequate substitute for the constitutive rules now
in place; and second, that since fiduciary duties should be understood
in terms of fairness ex post rather than private wealth maximization ex
post, opting out is wrong-headed.
I.

THE ROLE OF MANDATORY LAW IN A CONTRACTUAL SYSTEM

In thinking about the role that mandatory rules might play in a
contractarian framework, it is important to identify two distinct times at
which mandatory law operates. The first, t
00, is the point at which
the corporation is formed and the charter is adopted. The second, t =
1, is the point at which a charter amendment is contemplated. At both
times mandatory corporate law limits the ability of the parties to customize charter terms. Any of at least five hypotheses might explain the
existence of such mandatory rules: the investor protection hypothesis,
the uncertainty hypothesis, the public good hypothesis, the innovation
hypothesis and the opportunistic amendment hypothesis. All but the
first rest on the general argument that any efficiency losses from the
rigidity of mandatory rules may be outweighed by the gains such rules
18. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988).
19. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, § 7.17
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989).
20. See Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Exchange Act Release No. 23,486, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

84,018 (July 31, 1986); Grundfest Stresses Economic Efficiency as Goal of Commission,
Securities Laws, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1351, 1354-55 (Sept. 19,

1986).
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generate by addressing defects in the contracting process. I believe the
latter three hypotheses-particularly the last-have explanatory weight.
A. Investor Protection Hypothesis
Most contractarian analyses begin with the assumption that the
parties have equivalent access to relevant information and the capacity
to evaluate the information in light of their respective interests. This
information symmetry assumption is the basis for the assertion by
Jensen and Meckling that the promoters of the firm bear all the agency
costs associated with the firm's governance arrangements and capital
structure. 21 This leads to the claim that in the case of the initial choice
of rules at t = 0, absolute contractual freedom should apply, since the
promoters, not the purchasing shareholders, bear the full costs of features that are undesirable from the investor's point of view. Thus the
promoters will have the correct incentives to write charter terms that
optimize the joint wealth of shareholders and promoters.
An investor protection argument flows directly from rejection of
the contractarian information assumption. Many investors do not read
the prospectus or do not understand or fully register the entailments of
charter provisions. Promoters may therefore include charter terms that
negatively affect shareholder interests without bearing the cost; investors will pay too much for such shares. 22 Thus mandatory law represents the state's setting of nonvariable quality standards to protect
investors against the risks of misinformation.
The investor protection hypothesis, then, has two components:
First, that a special class of investors-uninformed and unsophisticated
investors-will be systematically victimized by unexpected, one-sided
charter terms. Second, that charter terms, unlike other information
that may affect investors' expected returns, are not priced, so that even
23
informed investors may be victimized.
21. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1. There are three components of agency
costs: the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the
agent, and the residual loss. Id. at 308. The text uses "promoters" to refer to those
who start up the firm and take it public. This corresponds to the "entrepreneur-manager" or "owner-manager" of Jensen and Meckling's terminology. Id.
22. This argument assumes that the promoter has greater knowledge than the investor about the implications of a particular charter term, not that both parties may be
ignorant about those implications. If knowledge of these implications were randomly
distributed among promoters and investors, then investors would not on average pay
too much for the stock.
23. There is a third component that will not be discussed: that the state can successfully generate minimum quality corporate law terms that protect purchasers from
misinformation. See Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17
J.L. & Econ. 461, 488-91 (1974). At the very least the informational problems associated with customized charter provisions in a nonmandatory regime will be much mitigated by the standard provisions of a mandatory regime.
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1. Informed vs. Uninformed Investors. - It is a mistake to assume that
investors can obtain information only through independent research,
i.e., to isolate individuals from markets. 24 Well-functioning securities
markets aggregate information from all active market participants, embody that information in a single fact-price-and make that fact available for free. 2 5 There are nevertheless significant gains from having
information first, of course, and some investors will find it profitable to
spend resources to become specifically informed. 2 6 In equilibrium, we
would expect to see a pattern in which some investors choose to become specifically informed, others choose to remain uninformed, acting as price takers in the market, and still others choose to follow a
mixed strategy. 2 7 Let us assume that unsophisticated investors are
likely to be uninformed (or underinformed), either because they have
undertaken no (or too little) securities research or because they are unable accurately to process information if received. The uninformed investors will pay too high a price only if the market is not efficient, that
is, only if there are too few sophisticated market participants who
choose to become specifically informed. 28 It therefore seems unlikely
that investors who buy shares in secondary market trading on the
highly efficient national securities markets could be systematically victimized by unexpected charter terms.
The real thrust of the investor protection hypothesis must be that
the pricing of novel charter terms occurs in a market that is much less
efficient, the initial public offering (IPO) market, where uninformed investors may be victimized. There are several problems with this claim,
however. First, the IPO market has a heavy institutional component.
The SEC's 1971 Institutional Investor Study indicated that institutional
investors purchased nearly one third of the shares of a large group of
24. This point is made in the context of the consumer market in Schwartz &Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 637 (1979).
25. See Gordon & Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 768-71 (1985).
26. Search costs respecting adverse charter terms will be significantly reduced by
the public disclosure requirements under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. V 1987), as reinforced by issuer and underwriter liability.
Such disclosure generally brings to light the actual charter terms, particularly those having a material adverse impact upon public shareholders. These charter terms can be
assessed in light of similar terms for firms that are already trading in the secondary
market, where the effect on firm payouts in various circumstances over time can be more
fully evaluated.
27. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 25, at 786-96; Grossman & Stiglitz, On
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980).
28. Unsophisticated investors may also pay too high a price because they are undiversified and bear firm-specific risk for which they are uncompensated. See Elton &
Gruber, The Lessons of Modem Portfolio Theory, in B. Longstreth, Modem Investment
Management and the Prudent Man Rule 161, 171 app. (1986); Gordon & Kornhauser,
supra note 25, at 778.
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raiidomly selected IPOs during the 1968-69 period.2 9 In light of the
increasing institutionalization of markets over the two subsequent decades, 30 it seems highly probable that current institutional participation
would be even greater. 3 1 Since issuers must offer securities on the
same terms to all investors, unsophisticated investors can free3 2ride on
the efforts of sophisticated investors even in the IPO market.

The role that underwriters play in the IPO market also reduces the
investor protection problem. Underwriters are experts in understanding the implications of particular charter provisions on expected investor returns. In explaining to the issuer the trade-off of a particular
charter provision against price, the underwriter is in effect the bargaining agent of prospective public shareholders as a group. The underwriter's fidelity to a fair bargain with the issuer on behalf of public
shareholders is supported by reputation effects.3 3 Underwriters will
engage in repetitive dealings with many of the same customers, and
news of an underwriter's permitting an unpriced adverse charter term
29. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R.
Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 2345 (1971) [hereinafter Institutional Investor
Report].
30. See Columbia University School of Law Center for Law & Economic Studies
Institutional Investor Project, The Growth of Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets 9-14 (1988) (institutional holdings of U.S. equities increased, on estimate, from
31.1% in 1970 to 42.7% in 1986).
31. But cf. K. Weiss, The Post-Offering Price Performance of Closed-End Funds,
Fin. Mgmt. (forthcoming Autumn 1989) (for control sample of 59 equity IPOs between
1986-87, reporting institutions (those holding assets of more than $100 million) owned
22% on average after first quarter, but 29% after third quarter).
32. One possible objection to this argument is that institutions participate in IPOs
in a highly selective manner so that in many cases unsophisticated investors would not
receive a free ride. In general, the evidence does not support this objection. The onethird average purchase figure does not conceal a radically skewed distribution of institutional purchases, in which institutions purchased many issues heavily and left many
others untohched. See Institutional Investor Report, supra note 29, at 2350-73. On the
other hand, institutions did seem to avoid low-priced IPOs (offering price below $7),
purchasing on average only 7% of these offerings. Id. at 2353. Such offerings accounted for less than 2% of the dollar value of IPOs in the sample, however, and only
buttress the point that there is an important role for suitability rules and merit regulation for small issue IPO. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. Another possible objection to this argument is that since the rationing of an oversubscribed IPO limits
the amount that any investor can purchase, sophisticated investors will have insufficient
incentive to do research. The unlikely implication of this argument is that sophisticated
investors are victimized in IPOs. Even if informed investors cannot buy an unlimited
amount from the IPO (or receive sufficient other compensation through the systematic
underpricing of IPOs, see infra note 37), they can receive a return on their information
in aftermarket purchases and sales.
33. See generally Beatty & Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 213, 214, 216-22 (1986); Gilson &
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 618-21 (1984); C.
Simon, The Role of Reputation in the Market for Initial Public Offerings (July 1989)
(UCLA Dep't of Economics Working Paper).
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would spread rapidly to future customers as well.3 4 Moreover, the underwriter's compensation is a percentage of the offering price, so the
underwriter has an independent incentive to discourage the inclusion
of charter terms that might reduce the price. Because shares of the
same class must have identical terms, the firm cannot offer better terms
to sophisticated investors than it does to unsophisticated investors.
Thus unsophisticated investors capture the benefits of underwriters' efforts on behalf of sophisticated investors.
Another factor bearing on investor risk is the well-documented underpricing phenomenon for IPOs. This means that "unseasoned common stocks typically garner large positive abnormal returns during a

short period following the initial offering," 3 5 in the fifteen to seventeen
percent range.3 6 Investors who are allocated portions of an under-

priced new issuance are guaranteed an immediate profit and a significant majority of IPOs are underpriced.3 7 Indeed, some economists
explain underpricing as an exercise of monopsony power by investment
34. See Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Per-

formance, 89J. Pol. Econ. 615, 616 (1981); Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53J. Bus. 27, 28 (1980). Reputation effects may be undercut by the lag between
the insertion of the adverse provision and the discovery of the adverse effect, which can
be several years in the case of equity.
35. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43J. Fin. 789, 789
(1988).
36. See, e.g., Ibbotoson, Sindelar & Ritter, Initial Public Offerings, IJ. of Applied
Corp. Fin. 37, 41 (1988) (average initial return for 8668 new issues between 1960-87
was 16.7%); Smith, Raising Capital: Theory and Evidence, 4 Midland Corp. Fin.J. 6, 19
(1986) (in survey of studies covering 1960-82 period, average initial return was approximately 15%); Tinic, supra note 35, at 789 (after adding additional studies to Smith
survey, average initial return was over 17%).
37. See Tinic, supra note 35, at 805.
Some claim that despite these short run gains, over the longer run IPOs underperform the market (although still earning positive returns). The two recent detailed
academic studies split on this question. Compare Ritter, The Long Run Performance of
Initial Public Offerings (July 1989) (mimeo) (IPOs between 1975-84 show three year
market-adjusted returns of negative 24%, exclusive of initial returns of 14%) with Buser
& Chan, NASDAQ/NMS Qualification Standards, Ohio Registration Experience and the
Price Performance of Initial Public Offerings 20 (1987) (IPOs between 1981-85 show
two year market-adjusted return of 11.2%, exclusive of initial returns of 6.2%); see Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. Fin. Econ. 235, 250-58
(1975) (IPOs in 1960s show normal market-adjusted returns in aftermarket over 5 year
period); see also Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 979, 996-99 (1989) (discussingjournalistic
and other studies showing underperformance).
The breakdown of Ritter's data reveals a number of puzzling phenomena, particularly that the sample underperformed the market for virtually every month during the
three year period and that underperformance in the third year of the three year period
was substantially greater than for any of the two prior years. This means that IPOs
continuously remained overpriced for a very long time period and that investors could
earn substantial trading profits through a strategy of buying the market index and selling short a collection of IPOs (subject to the logistical constraints on short-selling thinly
traded securities). These results reveal either an anomaly of significant dimension in the
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banks, who use their control over the distribution of IPOs to allocate
underpriced stock to favored customers. 38 Why would underwriters
put securities with unexpectedly adverse charter terms in the hands of
their favored customers? The underpricing will mitigate considerably
the risks to which unsophisticated investors are exposed, 39 as will the
tag-along effect. Even if one nevertheless believes that unsophisticated
investors could be easily victimized by adverse charter terms in the IPO
market, the indicated solution is not necessarily to impose mandatory
corporate law, at the risk of efficiency losses throughout the duration of
the firm. Investor suitability rules, which seek to protect investors by
imposing upon brokers and dealers a duty to determine that an investefficient market hypothesis, a major problem in the NASDAQ market where most of the
sampled IPOs trade, or a major problem in Ritter's computational assumptions.
Since the actual returns on IPOs in Ritter's sample are positive, the crucial step is
the adjustment of those returns for general market movements, which were strongly
positive for most of the 1980s. For example, Ritter's results are highly sensitive to his
choice between two possible market indices, showing adjusted returns of negative 24%
with the first index and negative 42% with the second. His results are also highly sensitive to the choice of endpoints. At the end of two years, on the first index, adjusted
returns are negative 12%; on the second, negative 26%. These adjusted returns exclude the initial returns that reflect the underpricing phenomenon, approximately 14%
for the sample. If initial returns are included, investors buying from the offering may be
regarded as attaining normal performance, depending on the index and on the
endpoint.
Buser and Chan present radically different results in a study of price performance
for NASDAQ/NMS eligible IPOs. They show positive market adjusted performance after one year and two years. Among the possible reconciling factors between the studies
is that the focus in Chan and Buser on NMS-eligible securities eliminated certain small
firm IPOs that Ritter included and that are the worst performing firms in his sample.
Although such firms are economically the smallest part of the new issue market, Ritter
presents his results in an equal-weighted way (i.e., each firm counts equally) as opposed
to a value-weighted way. This overstates the importance of small issues to the economic
questions at stake.
In sum, the short term underpricing phenomenon is well-documented and undisputed; whether there is a long term overpricing phenomenon is very much an open
question.
38. See Ritter, supra note 37, at 232; see also Chalk & Peavy, IPOs: Why Individuals Don't Get the "Hot" Issues, 9 AAII J., Mar. 1987, at 16. But see Tinic, supra note
35, at 791-92 (underwriters do not have sufficient market power for monopsony
explanation).
39. See Rock, Why New Issues are Underpriced, 15J. Fin. Econ. 187 (1986) (underpricing is means to assure that uninformed investors, who may invest indiscriminately in "good" and "bad" new offerings, but who will obtain higher allotment in
"bad" offerings (because informed investors will seek only "good" offerings), will on
average earn competitive rate of return and thus will continue to purchase in IPO market); see also Beatty & Ritter, supra note 33 (underpricing increases as the ex ante uncertainty about the value of an issue increases); Tinic, supra note 35 (underpricing
serves as implicit insurance for issuer and underwriter against legally actionable misstatements about issuer's prospects); Welch, Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and
the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 44 J. Fin. 421 (1989) (underpricing is issuer's signal of high quality in order to lower its costs of capital in subsequent seasoned
offerings).
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ment is suitable to a particular investor given the investor's risk-bearing
capacity and investment goals, provide an alternative solution. 4 0 This
41
is the direction the law has taken.
Small issue IPOs may present a distinct problem because they are
frequently marketed to individual investors rather than institutions, so
that often there may be no free ride. 4 2 These offerings present many
informational and quality problems for unsophisticated investors; the
content of charter provisions is perhaps the least serious. However,
40. See Suitability Requirements for Transactions in Certain Securities, Exchange
Act Release No. 26,529, [1988-89 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,352
(Feb. 8, 1989) [hereinafter Suitability Requirements]; L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 829-37 (2d ed. 1988); Fletcher, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 Duke LJ. 1081, 1108-09; Mundheim, Professional
Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 Duke LJ. 445.
41. The duty is defined by the rules of the NASD and each exchange. See National
Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, Sec. 2, NASD Manual
(CCH) 2152; N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 405, Diligence as to Accounts, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2405; Am. Stock Exch. Rule 411, Duty to Know and Approve Customers, Am.
Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) 9431. See generally I S. Goldberg, Fraudulent Broker-Dealer
Practices §§ 3.1-3.3 (1978); N. Wolfson, R. Phillips & T. Russo, Regulation of Brokers,
Dealers and Securities Markets § 2.08 (1977).
Prior to 1983 the SEC maintained its own suitability rule, Rule 15b10-3 promulgated under the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, for broker-dealers that were not
members of the NASD. In accord with Congressional mandates to increase brokerdealer self-regulation, broker-dealers were required to join the NASD and the rule was
rescinded. However, the SEC continues to promote the suitability doctrine under the
"shingle" theory, in which a broker-dealer is taken to represent that it will deal fairly
with its customers. See sources cited supra note 40. Moreover, the SEC has recently
adopted a special suitability requirement for broker-dealers who recommend so-called
"penny stocks" (share price under $5 and net tangible assets of less than $2 million) that
are not traded on an exchange or in the NASDAQ national quotation system. Sales
Practice Requirements for Certain Low-Priced Securities, Exchange, Act Release No.
27,160, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,440 (Aug. 22, 1989). The promotion of
these stocks has frequently been associated with abusive high pressure sales practices.
See Suitability Requirements, supra note 40, at 89,694 (proposing Exchange Act Rule
15c2-6).
42. To a significant extent, the small issue IPO problem tracks the distinction between "firm commitment" underwritings, in which the investment banker bears the risk
of unsold shares at the offering price, or a "best efforts" underwriting, in which the
issuer bears the risk. Based on a survey of IPOs from 1977-82, Ritter concludes that
most firm-commitment IPOs were bought primarily by institutional investors and best
efforts IPOs by individuals. Ritter, The Costs of Going Public, 19J. Fin. Econ. 269, 271
n.2 (1987). Moreover, "major bracket" underwriters-the underwriters who handle the
largest volume of new issues and who have the greatest reputational capital-rarely participate in best effort offerings. Id.
On the other hand, best efforts offerings account for a relatively small segment of
the IPO market-approximately 13% of the gross proceeds raised by IPOs in Ritter's
sample-and investors in such offerings are compensated by an even greater underpricing effect, 48% for best-efforts offerings versus 15% for firm commitment offerings in
Ritter's sample. Id. at 273. The structure of a best efforts offering is also somewhat
protective of uninformed investors: unless a certain number of shares are sold, the offering fails. And if a substantial percentage of the individuals who purchase from best
efforts offerings are sophisticated and informed, then the free rider effect still holds.
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most states subject small issue IPOs to merit review by state securities
commissioners. 43 In a nonmandatory regime, charter provisions could
44
be added to the items subject to review.
2. The Pricingof Charter Terms. - The alternative basis for the investor protection hypothesis is that charter terms, unlike financial terms,
will not be priced even in otherwise efficient markets. This is a puzzling
claim: A charter term that significantly affected risk or return should be
noticed by the informed investor, in the same way that any other business factor would be noticed. That the claim seems at all credible is
because under a system of mandatory law, many of the charter terms
that might have a notably large impact are not permitted, and idiosyncratic charter provisons in a world of mandatory law most often affect
payoffs in remote circumstances. Thus the change in expected return
will be small and the price effect unobservable. 45 On the other hand,
under a regime of contractual freedom it would be astonishing if, for
example, a firm junked annual election of directors in favor of a selfperpetuating board without affecting the issuance price of the next
common stock offering. In other words, if mandatory provisions were
eliminated, then presumably the charter would be subject to much
closer scrutiny and we would readily observe price effects for significant
variations from the standard form.
Evidence from current practice supports the view that investors do
43. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 25140(a)(2) (West 1977); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
§ 7308(a)(5), (6) (1975); Unif. Securities Act § 306(a)(2)(E), (F), 7B U.L.A. 574-75
(1985) (adopting Delaware's language). See generally I L. Loss &J. Seligman, Securities Regulation 105-22 (1989) (reviewing standards in all states for the denial, revocation and suspension of securities registration). Listing on a national market has become
a benchmark for determining whether an IPO will be subject to the state registration
process, which may include merit review, see id. at 121, presumably on the grounds that
natidnally-listed firms will attract the interest of institutional investors and well-established underwriters with valuable reputations, making merit review unnecessary. In 48
states, listing on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Exchange is the
basis for a registration exemption; in 12 states, listing in the NASDAQ system or the
National Market System is also a basis for the exemption. Seligman, Equal Protection in
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 687, 706-07 (1986).
44. The close corporation provides another example which suggests that
mandatory rules are not driven by investor protection concerns. For close corporations,
many state corporation codes substantially relax the mandatory rules that apply to public corporations, presumably on the ground that the parties have directly bargained with
one another to make utility-enhancing customized arrangements. But the possibility of
defective contracting seems much higher here than in the well-developed market case,
which may explain the greater willingness of courts to intervene on "fairness" grounds
in close corporation affairs. Relaxation of mandatory rules despite the greater risk to
innocent purchasers suggests that we need a rationale other than investor protection to
explain mandatory rules.
45. Cf. Weiss & White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors'
Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 551, 553-54 (1987) (finding
no statistically significant market reaction to important, unexpected decisions by
Delaware Supreme Court on matters that rarely affect particular companies).
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attend to significant variations in charter provisions no less than traditional financial or business information. For example, nonvoting (or
limited voting) shares issued through an IPO or through a recapitalization trade at a discount to voting shares.4 6 Furthermore, where firms
have varied from the standard pattern of one share-one vote, there
have been significant price effects; on average, share prices drop for
firms that issue limited voting stock through a recapitalization. 4 7 An
alteration in voting rights is a governance structure change that is apparently perceived as having the potential to affect significantly investors' expected returns and risk, either through greater exposure to
agency costs or a diminished likelihood of a takeover bid at a premium.
Thus the variation is priced.
Another example is the case of senior securities, both debt and
preferred stock, which frequently contain complicated contractual provisions relating to the circumstances of voting, representation on the
board of directors, conversion into common stock, call protection, redemption exposure, dilution and other such concerns. These terms
emerge through negotiation with the underwriter, acting on behalf of
prospective purchasers. The effort the parties put into negotiating
these terms strongly suggests that they expect these terms to be priced.
Perhaps the investor protection hypothesis is actually about a very
special class of concerns: those remote circumstances with high impact
on shareholder wealth when they arise. This concern must turn on a
special cognitive claim: that promoters (or firms) are more likely than
investors accurately to assess low probability events. There is evidence
that individuals underinsure against low probability catastrophes, such
as floods and earthquakes, 4 8 but it also appears that individuals overreact to risks associated with other low probability events, such as a
nuclear power catastrophe. 49 Which category potential corporate charter provisions fall into is a matter of speculation. 50 Moreover, why the
46. See Lease, McConnell & Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control in PubliclyTraded Corporations, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439, 458 (1983); see also Lease, McConnell &

Mikkelson, The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations, 57 J. Bus. 443, 451 (1984) (finding price premium for classes of stock with supe-

rior voting rights for six out of seven companies).
47. See Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 33-36 (1988) (discussingJuly 1987 study by the

SEC Office of the Chief Economist showing economically significant negative returns
upon announcement of dual class recapitalizations); Jarrell & Poulsen, Dual-Class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 129, 129 (1988) (finding
economically significant negative returns upon announcement of dual class

recapitalizations).
48. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms:

The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1440 (1983)
(citing studies and discussing policy implications of underinsurance phenomenon).
49. Id. at 1441.
50. If the "availability heuristic"-the tendency to overstate the relative probability
of events on the basis of personal experience, which makes events "vivid" or "salient"-
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individuals who promote (or manage) firms would be better than investors at avoiding this cognitive problem is not obvious. Focusing on the
cognitive issue, however, may obscure the more basic objection to this
concern as the explanation for mandatory law: there is little reason to
erect and maintain a mandatory set of rules with presumably costly rigidities to avoid events whose overall expected effects are low. It would
be a bad bargain. In sum, mandatory law cannot be justified on the
basis of an information asymmetry between investors and promoters. 5 '
B. Uncertainty Hypothesis
In a regime of contractual freedom, it is likely that different charter
terms will proliferate. Indeed, the corporate form might vary radically
among firms, depending on the desires of the promoters and the responses of prospective shareholders. One clear cost imposed under
such a regime, as compared to a mandatory regime, is the uncertainty
associated with different terms. The uncertainty hypothesis asserts that
the desire to eliminate the costs of uncertainty is the basis for
mandatory corporate law.
Uncertainty comes from many sources. First, the operation of a
particular customized term in different situations may be unpredictable.
For example, many firms accepted the shareholder written consent procedure added by the Delaware code in 1974 as a cost savings measure
to streamline shareholder meetings where share ownership was relais the underlying cognitive phenomenon, assessment of charter amendments could go
either way. An investor who had become familiar with a remote occurrence event because of a similar experience at one firm might tend to overrate the expected payoff
effect of a similar provision in a different firm's charter. See id. at 1437-38.
From a somewhat different perspective, recent experimental work on the willingness to bear uncertainty and ambiguity suggests that since a party who assumes a risk
bears its potential negative consequences, she has a greater incentive than the person
transferring the risk to exercise greater care in risk assessment. See Hershey,
Kunreuther & Schoemaker, Sources of Bias in Assessment Procedures for Utility Functions, 28 Mgmt. Sci. 936 (1982); Hogarth & Kunreuther, Risk, Ambiguity, and Insurance, 2 J. Risk & Uncertainty 5, 25-26 (1989). This suggests that if shareholders
principally bear the cost of low probability events, they will have greater incentives than
the firms (or the promoters) to evaluate and price such risks.
51. Nevertheless, some elements of mandatory law can be justified on the basis of
what might be called an intertemporal information assymetry. People living later will be
more knowledgeable than their predecessors about certain risks and outcomes. They
have seen how certain situations came out. Mandatory laws can thus be justified as a
corrective measure to avoid windfall gains to earlier promoters (or investors) and their
successors. For example, a rule against dual class common recapitalizations would protect public investors against significant wealth transfers that were unforeseeable at the
time the original charter was written, because of the anticipated protection of the New
York Stock Exchange's one common share-one vote rule. See Gordon, supra note 47, at
5-8. This intertemporal justification for particular mandatory laws would not provide a
general explanation, however, because most mandatory law does not appear to have
been adopted to address unexpected chances under prior regimes for opportunistic
behavior.
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tively concentrated. 5 2 A decade later, in the midst ofMartin Marietta's
Pac Man defense to Bendix's hostile takeover bid, the written consent
procedure played a pivotal-and unexpected-role in the undoing of
the Bendix bid. 53 Customized charter terms, which may be added with
much less scrutiny than a statutory change, will have many more surprising results. Since the same customized terms will not be adopted
by all firms, it is likely to take longer for the implications of such a term
to be understood than in the case of a mandatory term.
Second, uncertainty about operation of the customized term is
likely to run against the prospective shareholder and in favor of the
firm. The firm will have certain economies of scale in understanding its
own charter. The marginal benefit to the firm of investing resources in
understanding the operation of its customized terms is much greater
than the marginal benefit to the prospective shareholder who buys
stock in many other firms with different charter terms. The prospective
shareholder is likely to believe that the firm will take advantage of this
information asymmetry. By contrast, with mandatory terms, the investor is on an equal footing with the firm, because the investor can spread
the cost of understanding charter terms across all firms considered for
54
investment.
Third, the operation of the term may be altered from the parties'
"intention" through the vagaries of judicial interpretation (assuming
that there ever was a unitary intention). It may be difficult to formulate
a customized term that communicates unambiguously to the court what
that intention was, particularly since at the moment ofjudicial interpretation each party will presumably have a stake in a different intention. 55
Fourth, since any particular customized term will be tested in court
less frequently, the judicial interpretation of the term will be less certain. This will reduce the predictability as to the operation of the term
52. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 228 (1983 & Supp. 1988). The statute permits firms to

opt out through a charter provision.
53. Bendix launched its tender offer for Martin Marietta's stock several days prior
to Martin Marietta's offer for Bendix's stock. Because of the written consent procedure,
however, Martin Marietta, even though it would obtain Bendix stock later, could vote to
remove Bendix directors before Bendix could call a special shareholders' meeting to remove Martin Marietta directors. See A. Sloan, Three Plus One Equals Billions: The
Bendix-Martin Marietta War 146-47 (1983). See generally Aguilar, Firms Fear a New
Tool in Takeovers, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1984, at 27, col. 2 (discussing unexpected role

that shareholder consent procedure played in takeover contests).
54. Another way to make this point is to say that investor evaluation of customized
terms will be very expensive and that these costs, perhaps deadweight costs, could be
eliminated through mandatory terms. A similar argument on behalf of a mandatory disclosure system is made by Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 Va. L. Rev. 717, 723-37 (1984).
55. Professors Goetz and Scott develop at length the limits of the parties' ability to
increase theirjoint welfare by revising standard terms developed by the state, because of
the risks of erroneous judicial interpretation of customized terms. See Goetz & Scott,
supra note 15.
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in different circumstances. 56 This element of uncertainty will add another cost in the form of additional litigation expenses. Because outcomes will be less certain, litigation will be more likely and settlement
57
of litigation will be less likely.
From an ex ante contractarian perspective, however, these accounts of how nonstandard terms produce costs are not a basis for legal
intervention, because the costs of uncertainty will be borne by the promoters who author the nonstandard terms. That is, prospective shareholders will foresee the possibility of unpredictable effects on firm
payouts because of the customized clauses and will insist on a lower
stock price as compensation for this risk. To reduce these costs, firms
will stick closely to the standard forms except where customized terms
produce benefits that outweigh the costs. Two such situations are possible: where the customized term so improves the functioning of the
firm that the stock price actually increases, or where the customized
term provides a benefit that the promoters prize more highly than the
costs. For example, control over the firm may be so important to the
promoters that they opt for a self-perpetuating board, rather than annual shareholder elections, notwithstanding the discount in the firm's
share price. In both of these cases, the customized term is superior to
the standard term from the perspective of private wealth maximization.
Thus the uncertainty hypothesis seems to have little explanatory value
56. See, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale
LJ. 704, 731 (1931) ("One interpretation of a doubtful point in court or out gives clear
light on a thousand further transactions."). The underlying assumption that more frequent litigation produces greater certainty may be controversial. Law casebooks are
filled with instances where the result of litigation was to upset settled expectations. Nevertheless, unless a judicial system has a particular penchant for ignoring or reversing
precedent, extensive litigation over a particular set of mandatory rules should produce
greater certainty as to the operation of those rules in various circumstances. The dynamics of the state chartering competition should also favor states where the judicial
style is ordinarily to follow prior construction of a statutory or fiduciary term. See
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. &
Organization 225, 280 (1985) (arguing that Delaware's corpus of settled law reduces
costs for firms incorporated there).
57. See Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. Legal Stud. 1,
16-17 (1984).
Uncertainty, insofar as it leads to more litigation, will also impose additional costs
on the state, because of the need to add resources to the judicial system to process more
disputes. Litigation costs are not internalized. The state's effort to reduce such costs by
reducing uncertainty through mandatory law would stem from regulatory motives, not
private wealth maximizing motives (on the assumption that the parties found the costs of
uncertainty outweighed by the anticipated gains of the customized term). Cf. Ayres &
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules
(forthcoming 98 Yale LJ. 1989) (selection of suboptimal default rules may encourage
private resolution of disputes). As discussed above, the competition among states for
incorporations makes it difficult to sustain such regulatory motives. Indeed, states may
well compete by offering greater dispute-resolving capacity rather than by rationing capacity through legal rules that minimize disputes but impose costs on the private parties.
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58
for mandatory corporate law.

C. Public Good Hypothesis
The ex ante contractarian perspective argues that the uncertainty
costs of nonmandatory terms will be internalized, that is, borne by the
adopting firms, in particular, the promoters. This will be the case only
if the problem is analyzed firm by firm. Viewed globally, a regime of
complete contractual freedom in corporate law imposes externalities.
As charters diverge from the standard form, the uncertainty surrounding even standard form terms begins to grow. Those terms are tested
less frequently, either through operation in particular circumstances or
through successive judicial interpretation. 59 As a result, costs are imposed on firms with standard charters as well as firms with customized
charters whose terms may play against the baseline of the standard
form. Over time, the addition of customized terms by more firms will
lead to disintegration of the standard form. Thus although firms collectively are better off if the standard form is maintained, individual
firms will have incentives to deviate from the standard form in a way
that will eventually undermine it. This states the classic free-rider
problem that undermines the provision of a public good. In this particular case, maintenance of the public good of a standard corporate form
60
will require a mandatory legal regime.
This argument, in its strongest form, depends on the empirical
claim that the standard form will disintegrate if firms are permitted to
deviate from it.6t The widespread use of the flexibility now permitted
58. This ex ante argument most clearly applies in the case of initial charter terms,
adopted at I = 0. If customized terms are added by charter amendment at t = 1, the

uncertainty costs may be partially borne by public shareholders. This objection is part
of a broader problem of opportunistic renegotiation that is addressed infra at notes

79-112 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoreti-

cal Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 22 (1985) (value of standardized fiduciary
conceptions).
60. This can be described more precisely. Assume for any given firm there are two
elements of uncertainty from charter terms, uncertainty deriving from the standard
form, U s,and uncertainty deriving from the customized term, U,. It is my claim that U,

is not independent of Us,but varies directly with it. So for any firm, the proliferation of
customized clauses, which increases Us, will increase U, as well. If the payoff from the

customized term is greater than the cost of U, the result easily becomes a prisoner's
dilemma: the individually rational decision may be to adopt the customized term even

where the collectively rational decision is to maintain the standard form (assuming that
the costs of U s and U, outweigh the cumulative benefits of the customized terms).
Mandatory rules permit the collectively rational outcome.

An alternative claim might be that the use of customized clauses will generate litigation that will illuminate the area sought to be governed by the customized clause and the

standard clause and thus reduce Us. I find this an unlikely scenario because of the likelihood that the very reason for the customized clause is to deviate substantially from the

standard form. In such cases, dicta are unlikely to be very illuminating.
61. Even if the standard form does not disintegrate, complete contractual freedom
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under state corporation codes, including the development of assorted
shark repellant charter amendments and "poison pill" devices to ward
off hostile bids, suggests that without a mandatory regime, the range of
variation would widen. One possible counterexample is publicly issued
debt securities, most of the terms of which are not subject to a
mandatory regime, but which nevertheless use many standard
clauses. 62 Private means of developing and sustaining the standard
form have developed, most notably the American Bar Foundation's
Model Debenture Indenture. 6 3 But the public debt example in fact cuts
the other way because of the interaction of voluntary terms with the
requirements of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.64 Many of what
might be called the governance terms of a public debt indenture are in
fact mandatory, set forth in the Act, including in particular the role and
applicable standard of care for the trustee and the voting rules respecting changes in payment terms. 6 5 In sum, I believe that the public good
imposes costs, though of a lesser magnitude, by diminishing the stock of precedents
construing the standard form.
Another empirical claim is that overall welfare is higher in a mandatory regime, that
is, that the positive externalities across firms from maintenance of the standard form
outweigh the efficiency losses to particular firms from less well-fitting terms. One possible rejoinder is that if deviations from the standard form are so significant and numerous as to lead to its disintegration, this shows that the efficiency losses from the standard
form outweigh the positive externalities. It is the nature of the free rider problem, however, to produce such deviations even from the collectively rational outcome. For a general discussion of the problem of standard setting, see Besen & Saloner, Compatibility
Standards and the Market for Telecommunications Services in Changing the Rules:
Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in Communications
(R. Crandall & K. Flamm eds. forthcoming 1989).
62. But even in these cases, despite the standard formulation of particular clauses,
there is a great deal of variation among firms as to which clauses are included in an
indenture. See, e.g., McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law.
413, 424-26, 457-60 (1986). Moreover, it is well known that privately placed bondsbonds sold in large chunks to a small number of institutional investors rather than publicly issued-frequently contain customized provisions. This suggests that the peculiar
elements of the public markets in bonds-the lack of liquidity, in particular-are important factors in maintaining such standardization as exists. The stock market is, of course,
quite different.
63. American Bar Found., Model Debenture Indenture (1965). Of recent importance is also the Model Simplified Indenture worked out under the auspices of the
American Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, reprinted
in 38 Bus. Law. 741 (1983).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982).
65. In particular, in order to be "qualified" by the Securities Exchange Commission, the indenture must contain provisions designed to insure that the holders of publicly issued debt will be served by an independent and effective trustee. Affiliations
between the trustee and the issuer, the junior creditors, or the underwriters are not
permitted. Id. § 77jjj(b). Particular reports and certificates relating to the issuer and
the protection of any security interest are required. Id. § 77nnn. A standard of care is
prescribed for the trustee. Id. § 77ooo. Core terms-principal amount, interest rate,
and maturity date-may not be modified except by unanimous consent; majority vote is
not a basis for modification. Id. § 77ppp. But debtholders representing three-quarters
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hypothesis adds to the case for mandatory law in some circumstances
but cannot provide the entire explanation, in part because it provides
only a crude guide to shaping a corporate law system with optional and
mandatory elements.
D. Innovation Hypothesis
The claim of the innovation hypothesis is that a mandatory regime
may aid in the innovation of corporate charter terms. The basic argument is this: Innovation is costly for firms because investors will frequently draw a negative inference from the innovation that will lead
them to underpay for the firm's stock. These costs can be avoided by
state action that credibly signals that the innovation is desirable from
the public shareholder perspective. Thus a regime of mandatory law
that permits the state to send such signals through revising or relaxing
standard form terms may speed the process of innovation or lead to
greater diffusion of innovation.
For example, assume that in a regime of contractual freedom promoters modify the prevailing standard form provision on director liability so as to excuse the directors from personal liability for breach of
the duty of care. The prospective shareholder is likely to believe that
an adverse selection problem is behind the innovation: that the term is
especially important to this firm because the firm's directors are planning to be less careful than average or that the firm's business is riskier
than average. It will be difficult for the innovator credibly to signal its
belief in a contrary scenario, that the term will enhance shareholder
welfare because the firm's directors will make better decisions at lower
cost. The costs of the shareholder's negative inference will be borne by
66
the promoters, and they may drop the term.
of the outstanding principal amount may consent to a postponement of an interest payment for up to 3 years. Id. See Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 Yale
L.J. 232, 234-35 (1987).
Professor Williamson argues that debt, like equity, operates principally as a gover-

nance structure rather than a financial instrument, and that the differentiating feature is
debt's rule-oriented structure as opposed to equity's administrative structure.

Williamson, supra note 6, at 579-81. Understood this way, it is not surprising that core
terms, as the key corporate governance terms of debt, should be subject to a mandatory
rule of modification, for similar reasons developed in this article justifying certain
mandatory elements of corporate law. This is not to say that particular mandatory provisions of the Trust Indenture Act are optimally designed, as Roe argues with respect to

the present voting rules for modification of core terms. See Roe, supra, at 234-35.
66. The example is cast in terms of a I = 0 change, where costs are borne by the
promoters, but innovation costs also arise at I = 1, where costs of the negative inference
about a change in the directors' care level or the firm's business risk level would be
borne by present shareholders, who would thus be reluctant to adopt the change.
The problem for the charter term innovator is that there are no means of recovering
= 0 costs (or I = 1 costs in the case of an amendment) if the innovation proves suc-

cessful. It is not simply that other firms can adopt the innovation for free, or that there
are no entrepreneurial rents from a first mover advantage, as with a successful product
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In contrast, a decision by the legislature to convert a mandatory
term, such as application of the duty of care, into an optional term, is
more likely to be perceived as the result of a deliberative process that
has attended to interests of public shareholders. The costs of adopting
the exculpatory term pursuant to the legislative invitation will therefore
be lower. In other words, if mandatory rules are abandoned wholesale,
states lose the power to signal that certain optional provisions will create benefits for all shareholders. 6 7 Ironically, innovation may be harder
68
in a regime of contractual freedom.
The innovation hypothesis links up an important historical purpose of mandatory corporate law to its present function. Undoubtedly
many of the mandatory provisions of the first general incorporation
statutes can be justified by investor protection concerns, which were
entirely warranted in an era of undeveloped capital markets and limited
disclosure. 69 I argued above that investor protection no longerjustifies
mandatory corporate law, because in well-functioning capital markets
innovation. Rather, it is that the dilution has already occurred; shares have been sold at
a price based on the negative inference.
67. The signalling argument also applies in the case where the state simply adopts
the exculpatory provision or reduces the liability standard as a matter of mandatory law.
The decision to which the signal is directed in that case is not a shareholder vote, as in
an opt-in regime, but shareholder valuation of the firm's stock price in light of the
change.
68. A statutory duty of care provision that permits shareholders to opt into a liability limiting regime, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988), is a dramatic
example of the way in which the signaling effects possible through changes in mandatory
law can permit rapid innovation, but there are many other recent instances, including
expanded acceptance of promissory notes and contracts for future services as consideration for the issuance of shares, Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 6.21(b) (1984);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 152, 156 (1983); the shared authority of shareholders and
directors to amend bylaws, id. § 109(a) (1983); permissive indemnification of attorneys'
fees and settlements for directors and officers acting in good faith (i.e., even where they
did not prevail on the merits); id. § 145(b) (Supp. 1988). These are all instances where
prospective shareholders might draw negative inferences if a single firm innovated such
provisions, but might take comfort from legislative sanction as to the favorable expected
impact on shareholder welfare.
It should be noted that the innovation hypothesis does not claim that the state is
better equipped than the parties to identify private wealth maximizing terms-this seems
unlikely in a competitive market environment- only that state action can overcome an
information problem. Cf. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 Va. L. Rev. 219, 232-33 (1989) (signalling effect
explains mandatory risk sharing rules in bankruptcy). The state's action may also be
able to overcome a peculiar distributional problem as well: Since smaller corporations
may be subject to a greater adverse selection penalty from innovation, there is particular
value to a regime in which inefficient legal provisions are changed through a legislative
process that benefits all parties rather than through individualized opting out, which
removes the pressure for legislative change. See Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of
the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52, 81 (1987).
69. See, e.g., Friedman, A History of American Law 513-16 (2d ed. 1985). But see
Butler, supra note 11, at 136 (interest group/legislators' rent-seeking theory of corpo.
rate law enactment and change).
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sophisticated investors get what they pay for and unsophisticated inves-

tors can free ride. Nevertheless, mandatory terms can guarantee a certain level of shareholder protection. And if legislative action to permit a

firm to opt out of the previously mandatory term signals that on average the innovation will improve shareholder welfare-that the level of

shareholder protection is not diminished-then a mandatory regime
may produce greater innovation than a regime of contractual
70
freedom.
The legislature's signalling capacity depends on whether share-

holders generally believe that the focus of the legislative process is ordinarily shareholder welfare. This is obviously a controversial premise.
It is at the heart of the debate over state competition for corporate
72
charters. 7' The literature on rent-seeking in the legislative process,
and more specifically, the state adoption of antitakeover statutes
that presumptively reduce shareholder welfare, 73 give reason for
70. It may be that under a regime of contractual freedom there will be more varieties of innovation, as the standard form disintegrates, but particular innovations, especially ones that may create an adverse selection inference, may be more widely diffused
under a mandatory regime.
71. The debate is summarized in Romano, supra note 56, at 227-32.
72. See, e.g., Becker, Pressure Groups and Political Behavior, in Capitalism and
Democracy: Schumpeter Revisited 120 (R. Coe & C. Wilbur eds. 1985); Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society (Buchanan, Tollison & Tullock eds. 1980); Becker, A
Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. Econ.
371 (1983); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ.
211 (1976); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BellJ. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 335
(1974); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3
(1971).
73. Several stock price studies have shown negative shareholder wealth effects from
state adoption of antitakeover legislation. E.g., New Jersey Office of Economic Policy
Study, as reported in IRRC, NJ. Takeover Law a Bad Idea, Says State Economic Adviser, 4 Corp. Governance Bull. 188 (Nov./Dec. 1987) (New Jersey firms); Ryngaert &
Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 4 J.L. Econ. & Organization 373, 374 (1988) (Ohio firms); Schumann, State Regulation of Takeovers and
Shareholder Wealth: The Effects-of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes, Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission (Mar. 1987) (New York firms);
Woodward, How Much Indiana's Antitakeover Law Cost Shareholders, Wall St. J., May
5, 1988, at 32, col. 3 (reporting study finding significant losses for Indiana firms). But
see Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 11, 180-87
(1987) (finding no statistically significant effect on share prices from adoption of antitakeover legislation in Connecticut, Missouri and Pennsylvania).
There is also a legion of anecdotes about the hurried passage of state antitakeover
legislation to protect a favored local corporation under siege, for example, Arizona
(Greyhound); Connecticut (Aetna); Minnesota (Daytoh-Hudson); Missouri (TWA); New
York (CBS); North Carolina (Burlington); Ohio (Goodyear); Wisconsin (G. Heilman).
See Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988
Wis. L. Rev. 491, 492 n.4 (1988); see also Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1635, 1670 (1988); Butler, Corporation-Specific Antitakeover
Statutes and the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 365; IRRC, States'
Rush to Adopt Protective Antitakeover Laws Continues, 4 Corp. Governance Bull. 152
(Sep./Oct. 1987); Romano, supra, at 136-39; Ryngaert & Netter, supra, at 377-78.
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pause.7 4 Indeed, mandatory regimes raise the threat of innovations
that reduce shareholder welfare. In particular, it is conceivable that
managers could occasionally obtain a change from the legislature-for
example, a draconian anti takeover statute-that could not be obtained
from the shareholders. 75 This threat would be reduced if legislative
changes that significantly affected management's ability to entrench itself required a shareholder vote to "opt in" or required a later shareholder vote on the question of whether to "opt out."' 7 6 The threat may
74. One might distinguish between "structural" legislative changes, which entrench
managers, impede the market for corporate control and thus reduce the otherwise
salutory shareholder effects of the state chartering competition, and nonstructural
changes. Managerial rent-seeking may play a larger role in structural legislative changes
than nonstructural, precisely because of the greater insulation from the corporate control market that such changes bring. ,
The interaction of managerial rent-seeking and legislative rent-seeking in takeover
legislation is complex. Legislatures probably need not respond to managerial requests
for takeover legislation that would result in significant shareholder losses, because of the
strong possibility that shareholders would reject managerial efforts to reincorporate in a
jurisdiction with stronger antitakeover laws. But if those shareholder losses inure to the
benefit of in-state interests (for example, headquarters operations that will remain
open), the legislature may respond to managerial requests because of the opportunity to
exact a tax on out-of-state shareholders. Because reincorporation must be initiated by
management, the state need not fear shareholder reaction. SeeJohnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 846 (1989).
75. Indeed, one could generate an argument for a regime of contractual freedom
out of the possibility for managerial rent-seeking under a mandatory regime. The argument requires a belief that the risks to shareholder welfare are greater from opportunistic legislation than opportunistic charter amendment. Perhaps because of the heroic
assumption thereby required abbut the integrity of shareholder voting, no one seems to
have staked out this position. Those who favor contractual freedom also believe in the
vitality of the state chartering market, which restricts managerialist rent-seeking. See,
e.g., Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28J.L. &
Econ. 179, 191 (1985); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on
Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913, 916-23
(1982). Those who believe in the managerialist rent-seeking explanation of legislative
change are skeptical of shareholder voting and believe that the solution is better law,
either at the state level or, most desirably, at the federal level. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 696-701 (1974);
Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 Ohio St. LJ. 545 (1984). Coffee
stakes out an intermediate position, arguing that managerialist influence over the legislative process could be countered through modifications of the corporate standard form
by national law reform groups such as the American Law Institute and the American Bar
Association, because of greater public visibility and the greater efforts at balance. At
least as to the question of modifying fiduciary duties by charter amendment, he favors
"quality constrained" opting out, rather than legislative enactment. Coffee, No Exit?:
Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 919, 970-77 (1988).
76. That is, there are basically three kinds of legislative change: first, a change that
converts a mandatory term into an optional term, upon shareholder vote, either by opt
in or opt out (for example, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1988), which
permits an exculpatory charter provision for directors' monetary liability for duty of care
breaches); second, a change that converts a mandatory term into an optional term by
director action (for example, id. § 152 (1983), which permits directors to accept promis-
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also be mitigated by public exposure, deliberation and countervailing
77
factors that may push the legislature to the shareholder point of view.
The real question, then, is whether shareholders are better off, on average, as regards innovation under a mandatory regime. If so, the innovation hypothesis reduces some of the costs associated with possibly illfitting mandatory standard form terms and adds a justification for
mandatory corporate law.
E. OpportunisticAmendment Hypothesis
A rather different basis for mandatory corporate law is the claim
that mandatory law is a hands-tying mechanism that provides assurance
against opportunistic charter amendment. Even if promoters bear the
full cost of governance arrangements and capital structure at t = 0, this
would not be the case subsequently, at t = 1, when a charter change is
contemplated. Because of the sunk investments of the existing public
shareholders, the insiders (managers and controlling shareholders) will
not bear the full costs of new features that transfer wealth, i.e., cash
flows or control, in their favor. This creates an incentive for opportunistic amendment that, if not addressed ex ante, generates a cost that
will be borne by the promoters. Mandatory law-which prevents
amendment of the charter in certain key respects-may exist as the so78
lution to that problem.
Opportunistic amendment is possible because the corporate contract is inevitably incomplete. The parties cannot specify terms to cover
even plausible contingencies, for a number of reasons: the transaction
sory notes as consideration for shares); and third, a change that adds a mandatoiy term

or replaces one mandatory term with another. Second- and third-category changes that
tend to entrench managers or redistribute cash flows in favor of insiders obviously -reduce shareholder welfare. Unless a shareholder vote to opt in or opt out is required, a
facially optional change becomes a second- or third-category change, because of the
board's control over putting matters to shareholder.vote. However, even truly optional
changes pose a threat because of problems in shareholder voting. See infra text accompanying notes 82-86.
77. For example, after much pulling and hauling, the new Delaware antitakeover
statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. IV 1988), emerged in a form that probably
did not significantly impair shareholder interests. See generally C. Smith & C. Furlow,
Guide to the Takeover Law of Delaware (BNA Corporate Practice Series 1988). This is
principally because, in the view of experienced practitioners, the statute will not significantly interfere with all-cash bids for all of the target's outstanding stock. See, e.g.,
Labaton, A Debate Over the Impact of Delaware Takeover Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1988, at D1, col. 1. But see Testimony of GreggJarrell before the Delaware Senate and
HouseJudiciary Committees (Jan. 20, 1988), reprinted in C. Smith & C. Furlow, supra,

at 317 (estimating shareholder welfare loss of $40-$50 billion). For an analysis of the
conflicting factors generally. at work in Delaware corporate law reform, see Macey &
Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
469 (1987).
78. Thus mandatory law addresses what is also known as the "time inconsistency"
problem. Shareholders are exposed because they must act first-by investing-after
which the insiders may seek to add new features.
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costs of the voluminous drafting, the vagaries of judicial fact-finding
and interpretation, the limits of human calculation ("bounded rationality"), and the sheer unforeseeability of circumstance, for example. Because the contracts are incomplete and because the corporation
endures indefinitely, the parties are likely to create a mechanism to alter their prior arrangements. Responsibility for some alterations can
be delegated to a governance structure that responds to both managers
and shareholders, such as the board of directors. This accounts for the
modern trend to permit directors to amend bylaws, for example. For
other matters that touch on the very shape of the governance structure
and capital structure, shareholders will insist on the right to consent to
changes; a convenient procedure is to put such matters in the corporate
charter and to require that a majority of shareholders approve charter
amendments.
A formal document and voting rights do not solve the shareholders' problem, however. Proposed charter amendments will be sponsored by a relatively cohesive proponent, the insiders, who will argue
that the proposed change will improve the corporation's functioning in
a way that will significantly enhance shareholder wealth, i.e.,is wealthincreasing. A diffuse group of public shareholders must evaluate this
claim against the possibility that the amendment is merely "wealth-neutral," because all or almost all of the gain inures to the insiders, or
"wealth-reducing," because it will transfer cash flow or control from
public shareholders to insiders. 79 In these circumstances, shareholder
79. One question that must be addressed is why the proposal should be subject to a
shareholderwealth criterion if the normative goal of corporate law is private wealth maximization. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. It is easy to imagine situations in
which the gains to insiders from the proposal will outweigh the losses; why give shareholders power to block such transactions? One answer is that in the case of midstream
changes, the shareholder wealth criterion acts to ensure that the private wealth objective
is achieved. Consider two examples of dual class common stock recapi'talizations, which
entrench insiders. In case one, insiders value the increased control by an amount
greater than the resulting loss in shareholder wealth, so that the recapitalization is private wealth maximizing even if it harms public shareholders. In case two, insiders do
not value increased control by an amount greater than the shareholder loss and the
recapitalization is not private wealth maximizing. The only way to distinguish the two
cases and assure that only case-one recapitalizations occur is to force the insiders to
transfer wealth so that shareholders are at least as well off as before. If there is a surplus
after the wealth transfer, the recapitalization is private wealth maximizing. In other
words, a shareholder wealth criterion is the only means of assuring that a midstream
change in a corporation's charter or capital structure is private wealth maximizing. Thus
the shareholder wealth criterion is, in these cases, both distributionally appropriate and
efficient.
True private wealth maximization should, of course, attend to parties to the corporate contract other than shareholders and managers, such as bondholders and employees. However, such parties are often regarded as providing their inputs on the basis of a
fixed contract determinable in advance, and if they are hurt by a new shareholder-manager arrangement by more than the latter benefit, they will buy the firm. SeeJ. Gordon,
Duties and Markets in Tel Aviv University Studies in Law (forthcoming summer 1990).
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voting as a means of evaluating and consenting to a proposed charter
amendment is fraught with severe problems, in particular, collective action problems in acquiring and disseminating information among
shareholders, and strategic behavior by insiders that amounts to economic coercion. Thus insiders can exploit their advantages to obtain
approval even for wealth-reducing amendments. 80 From this flows an
argument for mandatory corporate law: The gains from eliminating
opportunistic amendment through mandatory rules will outweigh the
efficiency losses from the resulting rigidities, at least for a set of provisions with the potential for significant entrenchment or distributional
effects in favor of insiders. A necessary part of the argument is that
alternative rules are more costly, for example, a "freeze" rule that gives
parties freedom to establish initial charters but then locks in the terms.
Let us now turn to developing the argument. 8 1
1. Collective Action Problems in Acquiring and DisseminatingInformation.
In voting on a proposed amendment, public shareholders can
choose to become informed or remain uninformed on the probable effect on shareholder welfare. Since acquiring information is costly, a
shareholder with a small stake will almost always find that the expected
returns from becoming informed will be negative, even if her vote (remarkably) turns out to be decisive. Rational apathy is the indicated
course. A large public shareholder, by contrast, may find positive expected returns from becoming informed if his vote is decisive, but he
faces a different problem: Because other shareholders will be unin-

Accordingly, these parties are, for simplicity's sake, removed from the private wealth

maximizing calculus.
80. See generally Gordon, supra note 47, at 42-55. Collective action and strategic

behavior problems provided the basis for the SEC's recent rule on dual class common
recapitalizations that denies exchange listings for firms undertaking recapitalizations
that reduce the power of existing shareholders. See Voting Rights Listing Standards-

Disenfranchisement Rule, Exchange Act Release Nos. 25,891, 25,981A, [1987-88
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

84,247 (July 7 & 13, 1988) (adopting Ex-

change Act Rule 19c-4).
81. Although mandatory corporate rules may protect investors, the argument is

not, strictly speaking, an investor protection argument. From the ex ante perspective,
the possibility of opportunistic amendment would be impounded in the price promoters
could obtain upon the sale of shares; the costs would be borne by the promoters.
Mandatory corporate law survives because it provides the most efficient way for the par-

ties to balance the desirability of charter amendment against the possibilities for exploitation. On this view, mandatory law provides bargained-for, rather than

unbargained-for protection, and is thus not subject to the kinds of antipaterualist objec-

tions that standard investor protection arguments generate. Cf. supra notes 21-51 and
accompanying text.
Professor Romano objects that this argument for mandatory law fails as a descrip-

tive matter because of management's freedom to adopt opportunistic antitakeover mea-

sures. See Romano, supra note 16, at 1606. But the fact that corporate law framers had

insufficient foresight to anticipate the takeover movement does not deny that existing

mandatory law blocks other forms of opportunism and indeed may provide a basis for
new mandatory rules, whether at the state or federal level. See supra note 51.
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formed, his vote cannot be decisive unless he bears the costs necessary
to inform them. Since his expected returns from the combined costs of
acquiring and disseminating information will probably be negative, he
too will follow a course of rational apathy.8 2 Thus public shareholders
as a group will not be informed on the probable effect of the proposed
amendment. 8 3 The situation is a classic free-rider problem: Because
there is no .compulsory cost-sharing mechanism, the individually rational course is to be uninformed, even though the collectively rational
4
choice is for shareholders to acquire and disseminate information.
What remains, of course, is to determine what voting rule a rationally apathetic, thus uninformed, shareholder should follow: yea or nay
on every proposed amendment. Presumably the shareholder
purchased stock in the belief that management, at least on average,
acted in the interests of shareholders. This will generate a strong impetus for a "yes" rule, which the dynamics of rational apathy will tend to
reinforce.8 5 Thus the stage is set for the insiders to push through
82. The large shareholder may nevertheless become informed to keep open another option: to sell into the market where he believes he has a superior analysis of the
negative impact of the proposed amendment than the market generally.
83. This produces the apparently paradoxical result that markets are efficient but
shareholder voting is not, which means that market prices impound all publicly available
information but that voting outcomes do not. The difference turns on the nature of
decisionmaking in the two cases. In the market, an informed shareholder can earn a
return on an individual information acquisition decision, indeed, in direct proportion to
the number of uninformed actors. Thus markets will tend toward efficiency. In the
shareholder voting case, ajoint decision is required for an information acquisition decision to bear fruit. The likelihood of a return is therefore in inverse proportion to the
number of uninformed shareholders; thus shareholder voting will have limited utility in
producing efficient outcomes. The difference between market aggregation of information and individual decisions to become informed also explains why the innovation hypothesis (based on informed markets) is not inconsistent with shareholder apathy.
Compare Romano, supra note 16, at 1604 n. 14.
84. These results are sensitive to a number of factors. If a particular public shareholder holds a large enough stake, there may be some information acquisition and dissemination (because of the-potentially higher payoff) but the level will still be below the
optimum amount for the public shareholders collectively. The presence of other large
shareholders will reduce dissemination costs and make it more likely that the costs will
be shared. The size of the insider block, on the other hand, is a factor pointing in the
opposite direction. As the block increases, the percentage of the public shareholder
votes needed to reject the amendment also increases, which reduces the payoff to organized resistance. These factors influence whether the insiders will propose a wealthreducing amendment. See Gordon, supra note 47, at 44-47 (dual class recapitalizations
proposed almost exclusively in firms with large insider block and fewer than average
large institutional positions).
85. Because of quorum requirements, abstention by uninformed shareholders
would amount to a "no' vote in many circumstances. For further discussion of why public shareholders are unlikely to adopt a policy of "just say no" on amendment proposals,
see the discussion of a "freeze" rule infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
Professor Romano suggests that uninformed shareholders might reduce the risk of
opportunistic amendment'by a mixed strategy of voting "yes" on some proposals and
"no" on others on a randomized basis. See Romano, supra note 16 at 1608-10. Apart
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86
wealth-reducing amendments.

2. Strategic Behavior that Amounts to Economic Coercion. - The insiders' control over the structure and timing of proposals is another mechanism of opportunistic amendment. This control enables them to

obtain approval of wealth-reducing or wealth-neutral amendments
even where shareholders are informed. In the insiders' repertoire are
"sweeteners," "add-ons" and "chicken" tactics.
a. Sweeteners. - The insiders can bundle a wealth-reducing amendment with a "sweetener"-an unrelated proposal that increases shareholder wealth. This is vividly illustrated by the recent wave of dual
class common stock recapitalizations, which typically required a charter
amendment to establish a class of super-voting common. In many instances firms announced plans to increase cash payouts to shareholders
through stock buybacks or higher dividends,'but only if the amendment
was approved. 8 7 If the amendment itself increased shareholder wealth,
presumably there would have been no reason to tie it to new cash
payouts. 88 As this example shows, because the insiders control the
packaging, shareholders are obliged to take the bitter with the sweet,
89
and wealth-reducing amendments may be adopted.
from the unusual (and presently counterfactual) behavioral suggestion for shareholder
voting, the argument appears to require that uninformed shareholders estimate
probability distributions over opportunistic amendment and presumably adjust those
estimates over time. This difficult task is inconsistent with the assumption that shareholders following the mixed strategy are uninformed.
86. One question that remains is how all this fits with the efficient market hypothesis. How can it be that the market knows everything and investors know nothing? If the
market price quickly and accurately responds to the proposed amendment, then investors can become informed very cheaply and ought to act on that information. However,
determining the price effect of a proposal for a specific firm may be very costly, and if
the wealth decrease is small, impossible as a practical matter. See infra notes 115-17
and accompanying tekt. Alternatively, investors may not believe the efficient market hypothesis; i.e., despite a negative price change they may believe management's justification for the amendment. Still, it is likely that we would see more shareholder rejections
of amendments where the proposal triggered a large negative price effect. This threshold may bound the extent of the information asymmetry explanation for opportunistic
amendment.
A second question to ask is whether there are any constraints on the insiders'
proposal of wealth-reducing amendments. Amendments that are wealth-reducing because of a transfer of cash flows from public shareholders to insiders are likely to be
somewhat constrained by the market in corporate control, depending of course on the
amount of the transfer relative to the costs of a control shift. Amendments that are
wealth-reducing because of entrenchment effects present a different problem because of
disabling effects on the corporate control market. Thus, the risk of opportunistic
amendment is higher where the subject matter is the insiders' control rather than transfer of cash flows.
87. Gordon, supra note 47, at 48.
88. Another good example is Inco's combining a vote on a poison pill with a $10
special dividend. Inco "Poison Pill" Tested in Canada, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1988, at D8,
col. 3.
89. Another objection is that in bundling the proposal the insiders have added to
the public shareholders' information costs. Calculation has become much more difficult,
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The question, of course, is whether this use of sweeteners amounts
to economic coercion. Is it fair to see the whole proposal as a trade? In
surrendering control over some cash flows, the insiders give up certain
"agency benefits"; in giving the insiders greater protection from takeovers, the shareholders take on additional agency costs; and fully informed shareholders can assess the value of that trade from the
shareholder perspective. The problem is that this sort of thinking creates perverse incentives for insiders. Perhaps the insiders might have
been planning, or were in a position to plan, an increase in dividends
anyway, "for free." Any such increase may be delayed until the dividend increase can be used as a sweetener. In short, giving insiders the
ability to trade agency benefits encourages them to generate such benefits, subject only to the loose discipline of the corporate control market.
To legitimate the use of sweeteners in trade is to convert the agency
cost consequences of the separation of ownership and control into a
form of insiders' entitlement or property, in derogation of the traditional conception of the duty of loyalty. 90
b. Add-ons. - In the charter amendment process, management can
add features that are shareholder wealth-reducing, but as long as the
amendment taken as a whole is wealth-neutral or slightly better, even
informed shareholders will approve. For example, certain shark repellant amendments may be shareholder wealth-increasing because they
reduce the possibility of coercive bidding tactics and otherwise help
management act as a bargaining agent for the shareholders. 9 ' Insiders
may add on provisions that are unnecessary for the protection of shareholders but that do help entrench the insiders. Imagine, for example,
that the insiders propose a single amendment that contains a fair price
in part because some of the relevant parameters, such as the maintenance of increased
payouts, are within management's control. The bundling also means that shareholders
will not be able to rely on collective judgments that may emerge if similar amendments
are proposed in other firms. These added information costs increase the likelihood of

rational apathy, and once incurred, are a deadweight cost. In other words, since the
decision to become informed is endogenous to the particular case, a complicated
proposal may bootstrap its way to approval.
90. The problem is nicely put in terms of the contract paradigm's preexisting duty
rule for contractual modification. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. If the
insiders had a preexisting duty to increase dividends when appropriate in light of business factors, or at the very least not to make their private interests the basis for the
decision, then the modification, here the amendment, is coercive. To get that to which
they were already entitled, the shareholders had to make an additional payment to the

insiders through the wealth-decreasing amendment. The $64 Question, of course, is
what are the baseline duties of the insiders. Standard fiduciary duty notions of undivided loyalty, etc., are obviously at war with the view that baseline duties are defined in
terms of self-interested maximizing subject to market and legal constraint. See J.
Gordon, supra note 79.

91. See generally Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents, and
Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res.J. 341;
Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender
Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53 (1985).
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provision as well as a ninety percent shareholder vote requirement for a
merger. Shareholders may be protected against a front-loaded two-tier
offer by the fair price provision but will find it harder to accept a hostile
bid because of the ninety percent requirement. 9 2 Thus, even if the
amendment as a whole slightly increases shareholder wealth, a logically
separable portion is wealth-decreasing. Because of the insiders' agenda
control, 9 3 shareholders do not have the opportunity to vote on separate
parts of the amendment, or to reject the amendment and make their
own proposal.
c. "Chicken" Tactics. - Proposed amendments may be presented as
necessary to induce the insiders to conduct firm business optimally,
even though sub-optimal conduct will injure insiders as well as shareholders. For example, in the case of dual class recapitalizations, the
insiders threatened that without protection against dilution of their
control, they would not raise additional capital to pursue favorable investment opportunities. 9 4 Since the insiders benefit from the firm's
success, either from stock ownership or from salaries that are in some
way tied to profits, there is an element of "chicken" in such a confrontation with public shareholders. If neither side flinches, both are worse
off; if one flinches, both are better off than if neither flinches, but the
flinching party is relatively worse off. The insiders can generate credible threats and bluffs that put public shareholders at a disadvantage in
such a confrontation.
One particular scenario is worth pursuing in greater detail. Assume that pursuing profitable investments requires issuing substantial
new equity and thereby risks dilution of the insiders' control. The insiders may propose a shareholder wealth-reducing amendment that
strengthens their control, such as a provision for dual class common
stock. Rejection of the amendment, as a "no-confidence" vote, might
well reduce the insiders' payoff from pursuing the investment to the
point where the insiders' rational choice is to refuse to issue the equity.
That is, the no-confidence vote reveals the existence of a threat to insider control that would be exacerbated by further dilution. If the in92. See Jarrell & Poulsen, Shark Repellants and Stock Prices: The Effects of An-

titakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. Fin. Econ. 127, 142 (1987) (distinguishing
effects of different repellants).
93. Insiders' agenda control is embedded in corporate statutes that contemplate
director initiation of the amendment process, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)
(1983), Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 10.03 (1989), and in the decision in the
federal proxy rules to limit the shareholder proposal power accordingly. See Exchange
Act Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1988). Even in a regime of contractual freedom
directors are likely to have this initiation power and the agenda control that accompanies
it, because of the collective action problems that make it difficult to coordinate shareholder action. See generally Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and Its Implications, 63
Va. L. Rev. 561 (1977) (discussing agenda control in group decision making); see also
infra note 108 (discussing cycling problems that lead to director initiation).
94. See Gordon, supra note 47, at 49-55.
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siders highly value control, the negative payoff to them from a great
control threat upon issuance of additional equity will outweigh the positive payoff to them from the investment. Because public shareholders
will foresee that insiders will rationally refuse to pursue new investments if the amendment is rejected, they will approve a wealth-reducing amendment.
3. Interested Shareholder Voting. - Collective action and strategic behavior problems will be exacerbated by interested voting by insiders.
Under the laws of most states, amendment requires only a simple majority vote of the outstanding shares. 95 Thus a proposed amendment
will succeed so long as it attracts the necessary minority of public shareholder votes that in combination with insider votes form a majority.
These votes will be easily won if public shareholders have different
views about the wealth effects of the proposal-a likelihood if the
amendment is complex or is coupled with a sweetener. So given a significant insider block, a wealth-reducing amendment may pass even if
the public sharehoidrrs as a group accurately assess *the adverse effects.
Foreseeing this, public shareholders in firms with significant insider
blocks are more likely to be rationally apathetic. By similar argument,
such firms can more effectively employ the threats and bluffs of strategic behavior. To attain a simple majority, the insiders need to fool only
some of the public shareholders some of the time.
4. Charter Terms as Guaranty.- Of course, the limitations of shareholder voting as a means of scrutinizing proposals for charter amendments are foreseeable at the outset, at t = 0. From the ex ante
contractarian perspective, this exposure to opportunistic amendment
will be borne by the promoters. Prospective shareholders will pay a
96
price that discounts for the risks.
Thus it will be in the promoters' interests to reduce the risk of
opportunistic change and 'thereby reduce the discount at which shares
must be sold. More schematically, at t = 0 the parties will know that at
t =1 the managers will face incentives to vary the charter terms to
favor their interests, in ways and to an extent that is uncertain at t = 0.
The promoters will maximize the sale price at t = 0 if they can provide
an effective guaranty, a hands-tying arrangement, against opportunistic
change of those provisions that have a significant effect on the control
rights and distribution of cash flow vis-a-vis insiders and public shareholders. Promoters could presumably offer charter provisions that
make amendment very difficult or impossible. Several possible charter
terms to restrict opportunistic amendment come to mind: a "freeze"
95. Thirty, four jurisdictions, including Delaware, follow this position; fifteen require a two-thirds vote. See Revised Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 10.03 (1989)
(summarizing state laws).
96. Given the function of underwritem and securities markets, there is no reason to
believe that promoters are better situated than prospective shareholders to understand
the risks. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
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rule that would prevent any amendment, a supermajority voting requirement, or a disinterested shareholder voting requirement. The argument to be developed is that such charter terms are likely to be too
costly or inadequate and, on balance, less desirable than mandatory
rules.
a. A Freeze. - Although the freeze prevents opportunistic amendment, its rigidity means that parties will have difficulty responding to
changed circumstances or a miscalculation of the effect of particular
charter provisions. This will be very costly. Since charters in a realm of
contractual freedom will contain customized terms, there will be many
instances where the practical operation of these terms and their interpretation by the courts will produce unforeseen outcomes. 9 7 Some of
these outcomes may interfere with the smooth operation of the firm
and may put the firm at a competitive disadvantage to firms with superior charter provisions. Moreover, to be effective, a freeze rule will
have to apply broadly across the charter, not just to the terms that directly deal with crucial issues of control and cash flows; otherwise, new
terms may be added that undermine the crucial terms. 98 This will add
to the costs of a freeze rule because of the greater number of terms that
could misfire.
In sum, a freeze rule is a blunt instrument. The opportunistic
amendment problem arises in the first place both because amendments
will frequently be shareholder wealth increasing and because insiders
can use that fact as cover for amendments that are not. A freeze rule,
whether by charter term or, more broadly, by a "just say no" policy by
public shareholders in voting on charter amendments, is costly because
it does not attend to the first half of the problem. 99
97. See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 52-53 (discussing unexpected results
of shareholder written consent procedure).
98. For example, suppose a charter provision requiring annual election of directors

is subject to a freeze rule but provisions governing minimum notice periods before

meetings and quorum requirements are not. Changes in those provisions could affect

the ability of dissidents to defeat incumbents. Incumbents who own a substantial block

of stock could shorten the notice period and lower quorum requirements, permitting a

quick election campaign with a low turnout and increasing their chances of dominating.
Alternatively, they could raise the quorum requirement beyond normal turnout and con-

tinue to serve under a rule that directors continue in office until their successors have
been duly elected. A well-motivated legal mind will be fecund with possibilities for undermining any set of rules that offer differential requirements for amendment.
99. Once again the accumulated experience represented by contract law doctrine
may be a useful referent. The parties to a contract can always amend it, even in the face

of an agreement in the original contract to the contrary. West India Indus. v. Tradex,
664 F.2d 946, 949 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1981); Wiener v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 61 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1932) (A. Hand, J.); Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,
225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378 (1919) (Cardozo,J.); Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13
Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 574 (1960); id.

§ 763; 17A CJ.S. Contracts § 373 (1963). This common-law rule, a version of the "expanded choice" postulate, see text accompanying supra note 15, seems rooted in an

intuitive sense that the parties will be better off on average if they can always alter their
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b. Supermajority IVoting. - The goal of a supermajority rule, which
would require greater than a simple majority vote to amend the charter,
is to avoid the rigidities of a freeze rule while limiting the possibilities
for opportunistic amendment. Because these two objectives point in
different directions, setting an optimal supermajority percentage is extremely difficult, especially since the firm's ownership distribution will
shift over time. Too low a percentage will be ineffective against opportunism. For example, despite the economically significant negative
shareholder wealth effects of dual class common recapitalizations, 0 0
firms have been able to obtain shareholder approval even under twothirds supermajority requirements, in large part because of significant
insider blocks.10 ' This suggests that the standard sixty-seven percent is
insufficiently protective, given the risks of substantial concentration of
share ownership at various points in the firm's lifecycle and the collec02
tive action and strategic choice problems with shareholder voting.1
On the other hand, any supermajority requirement- especially at
the eighty or ninety percent level that may be necessary for real protection-will impose significant costs, particularly since the requirement
would have to apply broadly across the charter to avoid evasion. These
costs come in several forms. First, because a significant percentage of
shareholders ordinarily do not vote, it will be more difficult and costly
to adopt wealth-increasing amendments. Because a supermajority rule
raises the cost of proxy solicitation (necessary to rally the vote), at the
contract. The contract cases suggest that the courts are likely to find ways to avoid enforcing a freeze rule for corporate charters, rendering the rule insufficiently protective
against opportunistic amendment.
The evolution of corporate law also suggests the disutility of a freeze rule. At common law, extraordinary corporate matters, which included charter amendment, required
unanimous shareholder consent, a freeze rule in many cases. This was radically altered
by state corporate statutes that permitted corporate amendment by majority vote and
then later extended the majority's amendment power by overturning vestiges of the unanimity rule embodied in the "vested rights" theory. See H. Henn &J. Alexander, Law of
Corporations §§ 340, 345 (1983).
100. See Gordon, supra note 47, at 31-39 (discussing studies by SEC Office of
Chief Economist suggesting that on average shareholders lost three percent of the market value when the firm undertook a recapitalization proposal and indicating that these
studies may actually understate the extent of shareholder losses); see also Jarrell &
Poulsen, supra note 47, at 132-33.
101. See Gordon, supra note 47, at 79-85 (of 19 New York Stock Exchange firms
undergoing recapitalizations during the 1984-86 period, five were subject to
supermajority requirement); id. at 36-37, 45 n. 144 (high insider ownership percentages,
averaging 30% among those firms).
102. On the other hand, a study of the adoption of antitakeover amendments by
200 firms in 1984 finds that standard supermajority rules have a mild but statistically
significant impact. See Brickley, Lease & Smith, Ownership Structure and Voting on
Antitakeover Amendments, 20J. Fin. Econ. 267, 272, 275 (1988). The raw data of the
study indicate that on average approximately 66% of the shares were voted in favor of
the proposals (with 9.4% opposed, 5.2% abstaining and 19.9% not voting). This suggests that at least for firms with significant institutional ownership and limited insider
blocks, standard supermajority rules will have some bite.
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margin some beneficial amendments will not even be proposed. Even

under simple majority rules, firms have reported occasional difficulties
in assembling a quorum for annual meetings. 10 3 Recent evidence on
adoption of antitakeover amendments suggests that obtaining a seventy-five percent shareholder turnout might be difficult despite management's vigorous proxy solicitation. 10 4 Moreover, the wealth effects
of amendments may occasionally be a matter of controversy,1 0 5 so that
not all shareholders will vote in favor. The interaction of a high
supermajority rule and shareholder apathy will convert the

supermajority rule into a rule of virtual unanimity, meaning that any
dissenting minority will have a veto over proposed amendments.1 0 6 In
short, a supermajority rule biases results in favor of the status quo and,

in this regard, entails costs similar to those of a freeze rule.
Second, a supermajority rule invites the formation of blocking co-

alitions that can extract side payments for their approval of wealth-increasing amendments. These hold-ups can take many forms, including,

for example, the buyback of shares owned by the blocking coalition at a
premium over market. The problem is exacerbated by the de facto con103. SeeJ. Heard & H. Sherman, Conflicts of Interest in the Proxy Voting System
75 (1987). The problem is in part attributable to the difficulty in identifying beneficial
owners and circulating timely proxy materials to them, given the industry practice of
registering shares in street name or depository name.
104. See Brickley, Lease & Smith, supra note 102, at 289. The study shows that
across the proposals in the sample, the mean turnout of outstanding shares was 80%,
although the variation was considerable: the first quartile of turnout was 86% and the
third, 75%. The turnout figures were aided by significant insider blocks, 10% on average, not uniformly found in large public corporations. The 80% figure misstates the
extent of the turnout, however, because on average 5% of the shares abstained, presumably because the shareholders could not figure out the impact of the amendment on
shareholder wealth. The uncertainty that leads to such abstention presumably would be
exacerbated under a realm of contractual freedom because of the greater variety of charter terms and amendments across firms. Thus a 75% voting turnout might be very difficult to obtain in many cases, and, of course, some shareholders may vote against
adoption. See id. at 288 (9% vote to reject amendment on average).
The difficulty in obtaining high supermajority shareholder participation is further
illustrated by the tender offer experience. Even in the case of a tender offer for all the
firm's stock at a substantial premium, it may be difficult to obtain 90% of the shares. See
Letter of SEC Commissioner Joseph Grundfest, Dec. 18, 1987, reprinted in C. Smith &
C. Furlow, supra note 77, at 167-69 (analyzing potential threat to hostile takeovers from
proposed provision that required tender of 90% of target's stock to permit subsequent
freeze-out merger; final provision specified 85%). This behavior is not strategically motivated, because at best the nontendering shareholders will receive identical consideration in a subsequent freeze-out merger, reduced in actual value by the delay.
105. SeeJarrell & Poulsen, supra note 92, at 134-37 (canvassing arguments on the
effect of shark repellants on shareholder wealth).
106. This problem cannot be solved by framing the supermajority requirement in
terms of a quorum of shares rather than all outstanding shares. That approach both dilutes the supermajority requirement and encourages management to engage in targeted
solicitation of shares most likely to vote in favor of the amendments.
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version of the supermajority rule into a rule of virtual unanimity. 10 7
Thus supermajority rules open new avenues for opportunism while
10 8
closing down others.
Moreover, a supermajority rule is subject to evasion. For example,
imagine that the corporate charter protects a provision for the annual
election of directors with a ninety percent supermajority requirement.
Insiders who want to evade this provision can simply merge the corporation into a new corporation organized without an annual election requirement. Because mergers are frequently value-increasing events for
the firm, the approval requirement will almost inevitably be much lower
than ninety percent to avoid holdup problems. Thus opportunistic
mergers will supplant opportunistic amendments, and it will be very
difficult to develop a stable legal rule that sorts out opportunistic mergers in a low cost way.1 0 9
c. DisinterestedShareholder Voting. - A rule that sought to limit the
voting rights of insiders on amendments that shifted control or distributions of cash flow in their favor would alleviate some of the potential
for opportunism. There are many difficulties, however. To avoid evasion, the rule would have to apply broadly across the charter, as with
freeze and supermajority rules. As a result, insiders would have no vote
in many decisions affecting them principally as shareholders. This
would be perceived as imposing a high cost. The severe limitations on
insider voting also would engender complicated and costly efforts to
107. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. Rod Smith, in conversation,
has predicted the formation of firms that will buy appropriately sized blocks in firms
contemplating charter amendments. "Ten Percent Inc." is one suggested name.
108. This explains why supermajority rules are usually discussed either as protection for minority shareholders in close corporations, where shareholder apathy is not a
problem and where courts can police the opportunism of hold-outs under the quasifiduciary standards applied in close corporation settings, or as shark repellant amendments, the very purpose of which is to lock in the status quo. See Gilson, The Case
Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept,
34 Stan. L. Rev: 775, 812-13 (1982).
Apart from the observation that supermajority rules reduce externalities among voters but increase the cost of decisionmaking, see, e.g., J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The
Calculus of Consent 211 (1974), the political science literature seems to have focused on
a very different aspect of supermajority rules. This is the question of whether there is
any voting rule short of unanimity that will assure stable decisions in an environment in
which vote trading is possible. See, e.g., P. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction 378-81 (1986); Caplin & Nalebuff, On 64% Majority Rule, 56
Econometrica 787 (1988), Schofield, Grofman & Feld, The Core and the Stability of
Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 195 (1988). This problem
of cycling has not been an issue for corporate law because of a well-developed set of
institutions that constrain the agenda, including the requirement of board initiation of
charter amendments, the restriction of shareholder proposals to precatory resolutions
and other limitations on the capacity of shareholders to call special meetings and put
matters to shareholder vote. It would be a worthwhile project to model these agenda
constraints and to evaluate the consequences of relaxing some of them in the name of
shareholder democracy.
109. Opportunistic mergers also provide a way to evade a freeze rule.
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evade the "insider" category that would be costly to police. Moreover,
the limitation would address only some of the opportunism problem.
The collective action/strategic behavior problems that seem inherent
to the separation of ownership and control still persist."1 0 So a voting
rule change is not only costly but inadequate.II
5. Mandatory Rules as Guaranty. - Changes in the corporate contract are desirable to deal with unforeseen circumstances that cannot be
addressed through the governance structure that the parties have established. Insiders may capitalize on this fact, through their control
over the proposal machinery, and through the dynamics of shareholder
voting, to obtain approval of modifications that divert wealth, as measured in terms of control rights and cash flow, in their favor. Self-help
remedies to address these problems are costly or inadequate. The alternative to charters as a guaranty against opportunistic amendment is
a rule of law, which cannot be amended simply upon the wish of the
firm's insiders. Any change in key terms will occur through a legislative
process that in most instances will impose significant constraints on insiders' rent-seeking. 1 12 Although mandatory legal rules entail costs, so
do the self-help alternatives.' The persistence of mandatory rules can
be understood as indicating that some form of mandatory legal rules
will be the least costly solution.
II.

THE SHAPE OF MANDATORY RULES

A. Constitutive and Non-Constitutive Rules
The present system of mandatory rules is constitutive. The rules
establish the governance structure and set the standards of conduct to
which insiders will be held. But if the principal objection to contractual
freedom is the possibility of opportunistic amendment, then we can
110. Combining a disinterested shareholder voting rule with a supermajority requirement might address some of these problems but only at the cost of making it diffi-

cult to adopt any amendment, for the reasons discussed supra notes 100-08 and
accompanying text.

111. For these reasons, perhaps, disinterested shareholder voting requirements
have not been widely adopted in practice. See generally Sneed, The Stockholder May
Vote As He Pleases: Theory and Fact, 22 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 23 (1960). On occasion the

approval of disinterested shareholders can serve to shift the burden of demonstrating
the fairness of a particular transaction. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del.
1987) (construing Del. Corp. Code § 144 relating to interested director transactions);
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976). But cf. Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d

701 (Del. 1983) (rejecting fairness of parent-subsidiary freeze-out merger on disclosure
grounds, despite approval of majority of disinterested minority, and indicating prefer-

ence for arms-length bargaining by committee of independent directors).
For somewhat different reasons economists have recently argued that a simple majority rule that includes the votes of insiders has efficiency properties that make it likely
to be adopted in a realm of contractual freedom. See Grossman & Hart, One Share-One
Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20J. Fin. Econ. 175 (1988); Harris & Raviv,

Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules, 20J. Fin. Econ: 203 (1988).
112. See supra notes 71-77, and accompanying text.
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imagine a much narrower set of nonconstitutive rules, which are directed at the manner of making changes to the corporate contract
rather than to its substance." 3 One such rule is an exit ruleappraisal-which in its broadest form gives any shareholder the right to
cash out her stake in the firm upon adoption of any amendment that
she believes reduces shareholder wealth. This would arguably eliminate the public shareholder's exposure to opportunistic amendment. A
second such rule would require any charter amendment to be "fairly
adopted." This borrows from the contract paradigm the idea of a substantive standard for review of modifications and puts the matter to a
court or administrative agency. These nonconstitutive rules turn out to
be very costly responses to the problem, leaving constitutive rules as
the indicated solution.
1. Appraisal. - In theory, a rule that permits shareholders to exit
upon any charter amendment seems very attractive, because it bonds
the insiders' promise not to propose shareholder wealth-reducing
amendments. 1 4 In practice, appraisal will systematically undercompensate or overcompensate public shareholders. The problem is selecting the "fair value" measure that the dissenting shareholder will
receive in cashing out.
Assume that the relevant measure is the market price of the firm's
stock without the amendment. This requires determining the effect of
the amendment on the market price, net of any change in the overall
stock market, i.e., a one-firm event study. The technical problems in
such a valuation are very great, including but not limited to the fact that
113. Eisenberg uses the term "constitutive" differently to refer to a particular category of mandatory rules. See Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 1461, 1462 (1989).
114. The bond is not direct because payment will not come directly from the insiders, but from the corporate treasury, and the gains to the insiders from a wealth-reducing amendment would presumably exceed their aliquot portion as shareholders in the
corporation's payout. The bond must be thought to reside in the threat to the insiders'
control that a substantial corporate payout would entail, or perhaps some follow-on
legal liability that would arise for such cases.
The "ideal" appraisal remedy discussed in the text is somewhat different from the
version found in most statutes. First, it would be available for any charter amendment,
to prevent the undermining of crucial terms. Currently less than half the state corporation codes specify charter amendments as a triggering event for appraisal, in all cases
limited to certain kinds of amendments (most commonly amendments that eliminate the
accrued dividends of preferred shareholders). See Revised Model Business Corp. Act
§ 13.02(a)(4) (1984); Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 829, 833 (1984). Second, the remedy would be designed to reduce litigation expenses to the minimum and otherwise reduce procedural barriers. In its review of the
existing appraisal remedy, the ALI corporate governance project regards these procedural problems as the most important targets of reform and much of the current draft
proposal is aimed in this direction. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, Advisory Group Draft No. 10, at 4-7
(Sept. 23, 1988); see also Seligman, supra, at 856-64 (describing litigation barriers and
expenses).
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only a very large price effect would register as statistically significant.' 15
Equally troublesome is the insiders' ability to blur the market price effect by manipulating the timing of information release. If the formal
announcement of the proposal is on day 0, the insiders could arrange a
leak of the proposal on day -5, so that the formal announcement
would have been fully anticipated. Alternatively, the insiders could
generate a "confounding event" by releasing additional, more
favorable news in the relevant time frame. A study of a large number of
firms undergoing a similar event can more finely distinguish statistically

significant effects from random noise or confounding events1 16 and can
use different event windows to pick up information leakage. But for a

single firm, the price effect of a wealth-reducing amendment is unlikely
to be statistically significant and will be obliterated or muted beyond

statistical recognition by the insiders' information manipulation. Thus
the

appraisal

remedy

will

undercompensate

the

dissenting

shareholder.17
Assume a different fair value measure that is based not on the mar-

ket price of the stock but on its "intrinsic value" (which will almost
certainly be higher than the market price however it is calculated). 118
115. There is also the problem of correcting for the effect of price movements in
the overall market. If the particular test is anything other than the net price change over
a very short event window bracketing the proposal announcement date, it may be appropriate to use a market model test that requires estimation of the firm's "beta," the expected change in the firm's stock price relative to general market movements. (For
example, a better study might use an event window stretching from proposal date
through adoption date, or might aggregate price changes for several sub-events, such as
the board action, the formal announcement, and the adoption.) Single firm betas, however, are notoriously unstable.
One possible way to address these problems is through observation of single firm
price changes relative to a sub-index of firms in the same industry. See Romano, supra
note 16, at 1613. Defining the appropriate sub-index would be difficult for the many
firms whose business spreads across several industry groups, however, and insofar as the
particular action is in response to events that can affect the entire industry-such as a
takeover trend-the single firm stock price change is not independent of the sub-index
movement.
116. To generate a statistically significant result for a single firm sample the price
effect must be 10 times as great as the price effect for a 100 firm sample. See T.
Wonnacott & R. Wonnacott, Introductory Statistics for Business and Economics 220-28
(3d ed. 1984).
117. An additional consequence of the insiders' ability to blur the price signal is to
raise the shareholder's cost of employing the appraisal remedy and thus to lower its
utility as a bond. In order to seek appraisal, a shareholder must first determine that the
amendment is wealth-reducing. Observing a price movement is a cheap way of making
that determination. If the price signal is blurred, shareholders face collective action
problems in evaluating the amendment analogous to those faced in shareholder voting.
See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
118. "Intrinsic value" is not self-defining. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Marathon Oil
Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 397, 404, 513 N.E.2d 776, 783-84 (1987) (factors in appraisal may
include "net asset value; going concern value, liquidation value, net equity value, earnings value of the stock or dividends prospects; the nature of the enterprise and its rela-
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This measure might be used to avoid the undercompensation problem
or because it is believed to be the correct measure, particularly in light
of the large premiums over market paid in takeovers. Shareholders will
then have an incentive to opt for appraisal upon any charter amendment, whether or not they believe the amendment is wealth-reducing.
This overcompensates shareholders for the wealth effects of charter
amendments. It also creates a rule of optional partial liquidation contingent on any charter amendment.1 1 9 Perhaps in some global sense
this would be desirable because of the pressure it puts on the firm to
eliminate the arbitrage between asset values and the stock market price,
but it would also threaten the cohesiveness of firms in a profound
way. 120 More likely, the result would be an extreme reluctance to propose charter amendments-a virtual freeze rule, with the costs that imposes. The difficulty in deriving a simple measure of fair value means
that the appraisal remedy is not suitable as the sole check on opportunistic amendment.
2. FairAdoption. - Another nonconstitutive rule would require
"fair adoption" of charter amendments, as administered by a court or
administrative agency. This rule is inspired by the mandatory contract
law rule against coercive modification.1 21 The contract rule denies enforcement to contractual modifications that are not supported by consideration, or do not arise from changed circumstances that were not
reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time of contract formation,
or are the 'result of economic duress. 12 2 The reasons for this
tive position within the particular industry; post merger gains or synergistic gain; tax
benefits to all concerned; and recission and/or equitable concerns."). The ALI study
seems to put intrinsic value in terms of the "highest price that a willing buyer would pay
for the corporation as an entirety." American Law Institute, supra note 114, at 23.
Believers in the efficient market hypothesis would say that on average the firm's
intrinsic value should equal its market value, and that deviations should not be skewed in
a particular direction. Nevertheless, judicial determinations of intrinsic value almost invariably produce results greater than market value. See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 114,
at 850-51. Part of the reason for this may be that intrinsic value seems to embody some
notion of break-up value or third party sale price, which reflects expected gains from
bringing assets under the control of new, presumably more efficient managers, whereas
market value apart from the triggering event excludes this element of additional value.
119. Indeed, the result may be complete liquidation, since the best shareholder
strategy is to tender shares for appraisal and then repurchase the shares at the lower
market price.
120. Cf. Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223, 240-41 (1962) (potential drain of appraisal on company's liquidity if remedy is freely available).
121. After all, if the corporation is a "nexus of contracts," then we should see what
use we can make of the accumulated experience represented by contract doctrine.
122. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 2, §§ 4.21-4.22; Narasimhan, Modification:
The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 Yale L.J. 61, 73-77 (1987).
The traditional common law rule guarded against opportunistic modifications
through the "pre-existing duty rule," that is, the obligee was not bound by his consent
to the modification if the bbligor undertook only a pre-existing duty under the contract,
on the grounds that the obligee had received no consideration for his new promise.
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mandatory rule of contract are obvious: If performance is not simultaneous, one party will have invested greater resources in performance,
or in reliance, than the other party at any given time. These sunk costs,
in combination with a damage measure that is not fully compensatory,' 23 give the other party the opportunity to renegotiate the contract
on more favorable terms. Without the mandatory rule against coercive
modification, contracting would undoubtedly continue, but parties
would presumably resort to more expensive bonding procedures or
other mechanisms to protect themselves.
An analogous rule in the setting of corporate charter amendments
would be vastly more complicated for a court or administrative body to
administer. Since charter amendments are almost always advanced in
the name of shareholder welfare, there is no obvious lack of consideration. Since the corporate contract is of indefinite duration, virtually
any amendment can be justified by an unforeseeable change in circumstance.124 Moreover, the contract rule, which is based on a simple no-

tion of bilateral consent, does not attend to the crucial collective action
problems in shareholder voting.
Finding the pre-existing duty rule somewhat circular, contemporary common law reformers have tried to focus the inquiry directly on the question of opportunistic behavior and economic coercion. A modification may be enforced "if the modification is fair
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract
was made." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981). Circumstances of duress
also may be a basis for avoidance of the modification. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior
and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 532-34 (1981). The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-209(1) (1987) abrogated the pre-existing duty rule regarding contracts for
the sale of goods altogether, but retained the requirement of "good faith," cast in terms
of "legitimate commercial reason," id., comment 2, a change which focuses the inquiry
in terms of economic coercion. The complexities in devising a rule to govern modification suggest the difficulties of a comparable task in the corporate setting. See Aivazian,
Trebilcock & Penny, The Law of Contract Modifications: The Uncertain Quest for a
Benchmark of Enforceability, 22 Osgoode Hall LJ. 173 (1984).
123. The shortfall in the damage measure has several sources. There are technical
legal problems, including the rule that requires even a successful litigant to bear her
attorney's fees, inadequate measures of the time value of money, limitation on the recovery of damages that were not "foreseeable" by the breaching party and subjective value
placed on the lost performance that is higher than "objective," or consensus, value. See
Narasimhan, supra note 122, at 65-66. There are proof problems; the matters over
which the parties have contracted may be apparent to the parties but not readily demonstrable to a court. There are also noncompensable damages that arise from asset specific investment in a trading relationship, in which the party that has made the greater
investment will be more severely damaged by termination of the relationship. See, e.g.,
0. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism 52-56, 190-205 (1985).
124. Moreover, the difficulties in pplicing "good faith" modifications in contracts
for the sale of goods under the UCC are mitigated by reputation effects among
merchants regularly engaged in commercial activity. Corporations do not face analogous reputation effects in adopting opportunistic charter amendments because of the
infrequency of their trips to the equity capital markets. See Stout, The Unimportance of
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613, 645-47 (1988).
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Thus a rule of fair adoption would presumably generate a set of
sub-rules about both the procedures by which the proposal was put to
shareholders and the substantive fairness of the amendment, that is,
sub-rules designed to cull out wealth-reducing amendments. In effect,
the rule would regard a charter amendment in the same light as a
merger between a parent and a partially owned subsidiary, a transaction over which the insiders have control and as to which review for
fairness is therefore appropriate. If cases like Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 125
are followed, courts will look for evidence of "fair dealing" and "fair
price." The extent of interested voting, the adequacy of disclosure, reimbursement rules for dissidents' counter proxy expenses and the
structuring of the proposal will be relevant on the fair dealing question.
In other words, the court will scrutinize the particular case for evidence
of significant collective action and strategic behavior problems. The
fair dealing review may evolve toward a rqquirement of a bargaining
agent acting specifically on behalf of public shareholders to replicate
arm's length negotiation over the specifics of the amendment, with the
power to make an independent recommendation. 1 2 6 In the absence of
fair dealing, the court may require the insiders to show fair price, that
is, that the amendment indeed increased shareholder wealth. Even
with fair dealing, a public shareholder might show that the amendment
was wealth-reducing and obtain the amendment's cancellation.
Thus a nonconstitutive rule of fair adoption will in the end become
constitutive, as the court prescribes specific corporate governance procedures. A large set of mandatory rules will develop to cover important
areas of corporate law, except that these will be prescribed by a court
rather than a legislature. Moreover, judicial review will entail invasive
and very costly involvement by the courts in the merits of particular
renegotiations between insiders and public shareholders.' 2 7 Thus it is
125. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Subsequent cases which have employed the
Weinberger test of fairness or a similar test include: Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1988); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d
1099, 1105-07 (Del. 1985); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937-45 (Del.
1985); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 569-73, 473 N.E.2d 19, 26-28,
483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 674-77 (1984); Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or. App. 604, 618-25, 767
P.2d 903, 911-15 (1989).
126. See Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 938 n.7; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7; cf.
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (target directors, found to
have acted without objectivity and requisite loyalty, enjoined from preemptive strike in
response to hostile bid); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. Shareholders Litig., Civ. A. No.
9844, (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file) (use of special negotiating committee of disinterested directors shifts burden of proving unfairness to plaintiff).
127. However, any adequate view of mandatory corporate law must account for the
role that courts do play. Even though judicial review may be a very costly response to
the opportunistic amendment problem in a realm of contractual freedom, it may play a
cost-reducing role in a regime with mandatory corporate law. Courts may address some
of the rigidities inherent in a system with mandatory rules through adaptive interpretations that take a "thin" rather than "thick" view of the rules in question. Coffee devel-
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reasonable to believe that a set of constitutive rules generated by the
legislature that limit the range of potential charter terms, thereby limiting the range of opportunistic amendment, will ultimately entail lower
costs than nonconstitutive rules.' 2 8
B. Mandatory Rules
There are four sorts of mandatory rules in modem corporation
statutes: procedural, power allocating, economic transformative, and
fiduciary standards setting. The persistence of these rules may be understood in terms of the public good hypothesis, the innovation hypothesis, and the opportunistic amendment hypothesis.
1. ProceduralRules. - Some mandatory rules of corporate law are
procedural. They do not allocate power or cash flow, but merely serve
the allocations that have been made. 12 9 Although the content of these
rules is somewhat arbitrary-if a particular notice provision specifies
ten days, probably fifteen or eight would suit just as well-their
mandatory nature may be justified on two accounts. First, the infrequent litigation regarding such provisions often arises in high-stakes
situations, such as heated battles for corporate control.' 30 Thus, it is
important to build a stock of precedents that construe the same provision (a public good rationale). Moreover, any midstream amendment
of such a provision is highly suspect since it is likely to be a tactical
maneuver in or anticipating a control struggle (an opportunistic
amendment rationale).
ops this point with some nice examples, including the judicial acceptance of low par
stock under the legal capital statutes, and poison pill rights, subject to heightened business judgment rule scrutiny, under the various corporate finance statutes. See Coffee,
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1618, 1635-40, 1652-53 (1989).
128. Another possible solution is a regime in which parties at the outset may make
a one-time choice between a mandatory subregime and an optional subregime, so that a
mandatory regime could be provided for situations where appropriate without extending its rigidity to all cases. However, the existence of the optional regime would
have significant spillover effects, including public-good losses from reduced occasions
for judicial interpretation of the mandatory form and, most importantly, the cost of anticipated opportunistic conversion between subregimes through the mechanism of
mergers and other business combinations.
129. For example, in Delaware, written notice of a shareholder meeting must be
given no more than sixty, and no less than ten days before a meeting, Del. Code Ann. tit.
8, § 222(b) (1983 & Supp. 1988), and the record date for shareholder meetings must fall
within a similar time frame. Id. § 213(a). A broader example is the set of very detailed
requirements for the perfection of an appraisal remedy. Id. § 262(d).
130. See, e.g., Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Carlson, 628 F. Supp. 244 (D. Del. 1985)
(where shareholders are acting through written consent procedure in corporate control
contest, board may not change record date after first written consent has been filed);
Empire of Carolina, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 501 A.2d 1252 (Del. Ch. 1985) (same circumstances, except that where shareholders do not specify record date correctly, as prescribed by statute, board may reset record date).
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2. Power Allocating. - Many mandatory rules of corporate law allocate power throughout the governance structure, affecting, in particular, the balance of power between directors and shareholders. The
managerial role of the board,' 3 ' shareholder voting rights in the election of directors 132 and shareholder removal rights 13 3 are classic examples. Because the corporate contract is radically incomplete, many
future decisions are left to the governance structure. Thus many important economic outcomes will be highly sensitive to changes in the
allocation of power.
All three rationales operate in these circumstances. First, the output of a governance structure can be best understood by repeat experience in different settings of identical, or nearly identical, governance
forms. As governance structures deviate from the baseline, incidents
become too particularized; they lose their experimental usefulness. All
profit from maintenance of a standard form. This is a public good rationale. Second, because governance structures are the Archimedean
lever, public shareholders will suspect that innovative terms are intended to empower the insiders at their expense. By contrast, a change
that comes upon legislative invitation after public deliberation may give
assurance of a likely increase in shareholder wealth that eliminates any
capital market penalty for the adopting firm. This is the innovation rationale. Finally, because of the key role of the governance structure,
shareholders will be highly wary of midstream changes that could significantly shift wealth and control away from them and to the insiders,
changes that can be obtained through a voting process known to be
riddled with shareholder choice problems. The opportunistic amendment rationale explains why a mandatory legal rule is the indicated
solution.
3. Economic Transformative. - Transactions that transform the economic structure of the firm are generally governed by mandatory rules:
mergers in which the firm does not survive or the ownership stake of
the existing shareholders is significantly diluted,' 3 4 the sale of substantially all assets, 13 5 or the firm's dissolution. 136 These occur once in the
life of a firm. The uniqueness of such an event for any single firm and
the potential for widely different outcomes turning on the application
of different terms are strong reasons to have a standard form. Thus the
public good rationale has weight in explaining why these rules are
mandatory. Because of the fear that any midstream change would tilt
economic payoffs in a large-scale way, and because of the final period
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

E.g.,
E.g.,
E.g.,
E.g.,
E.g.,
E.g.,

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
id. § 211(b).
id. § 141(k).
id. § 251.
id. § 271.
id. § 275.
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problem 13 7 that would make such an effort tempting,,the opportunistic
amendment rationale may be even more important.
4. Fiduciary Standard Setting. - There are two distinct reasons for
mandatory fiduciary duties for directors, officers, and controlling shareholders. The first is a kind of contractarian reason that is by now familiar to readers of this Article: Even if the content of fiduciary duties
should be the bargain the parties would have reached in the absence of
transaction costs (the content principle), flaws and externalities in the
contracting process require us to reject the opt out principle. More
specifically, since insiders have substantial control over the amendment
process, they are continually tempted to relax fiduciary standards that
govern their behavior and expose them to liability. A mandatory rule
eliminates this threat of opportunism while leaving recourse to the leg138
islative process to modify duties-to innovate-where appropriate.
Further, a stable conception of fiduciary duty develops only through
applying a single standard across a great range of cases. Such a baseline represents a valuable public good, since the verbal formulas and
the standards would vary considerably in the absence of a mandatory
rule.
A second reason is that contractarian principles operate differently
for fiduciary duties than for statutory corporate law in ways that make
opting out of fiduciary duties particularly troublesome and ultimately
wrong-headed, especially for elements of the duty of loyalty. Fiduciary
duties provide a set of standards to restrain insiders in exercising their
discretionary power over the corporation and its shareholders in contingencies not specifically foreseeable and thus over which the parties
could not contract. Accordingly, parties do not know the decision rule
for matters governed by fiduciary duties at the time that they enter into
the corporate contract. This is different from the contractarian view of
statutory law. Although statutes should, in principle, embody the parties' hypothetical bargain, the statutes (or the modifying charter provisions) are always specified at the time of contracting so that the parties
will know the applicable decision rules. 13 9 In other words, the content
137. "Final period problems" refer to the breakdown in market constraints when
the particular transaction is the last one in a series, so that there is no penalty for welshing on an implied (in the economist's sense) contract. For applications in the corporate
context, see R. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 579-80, 847
(1986).

138. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). See supra notes
66-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the innovation rationale in the context
of the duty of care. Coffee argues instead for what I have called a nonconstitutive
mandatory rule, a rule of judicial review that scrutinizes amendments that opt out of
particular fiduciary duties under a fairness standard, presumably guided by the teachings

of the ALL. Coffee, supra note 127, at 1676-83. This will produce a different set of
judicially crafted mandatory rules without the public good effects of a single standard.

139. This is put somewhat schematically, since any statute or charter provision will
be subject to interpretive uncertainty. But the point holds so long as the statutory bargain produces outcomes over specific contingencies that are relatively determinate.
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of the parties' actual ex ante bargain has been specified in the statutory
case. In the fiduciary duty case, the key issue is how to supply the content of the decision rule in particular circumstances, bearing in mind
that here the parties' ex ante bargain is only hypothetical. It is my argument that parties taking into account the insiders' power and positional
advantage would pick a standard of fairness or good faith as measured
ex post and that this radically undermines the case for opting out of
fiduciary duties.140

The contractarian literature has obscured this conclusion (one that
is commonplace among traditional legal scholars 14 1) by proposing the
wrong standard-private wealth maximization as measured ex post-to
supply the content in fiduciary duty cases. The claim is that the parties
would have agreed to the rule that maximizes the corporate pie as of
the time of decision-that is, ex post-because then each party could
have a bigger slice.' 4 2 The gap in this argument, as in other KaldorHicks arguments, is that it does not guarantee that each party will in
fact receive a bigger slice, or a slice of the right size. Had the parties
foreseen the result at the time of contracting, they would have shared
the gain: The price of the shares would have changed or some other
term would have been altered. Since they did not, one party will be
better off ex post, but the other party may be worse off. A transaction,
for example, that maximizes the sum of public shareholder and insider
wealth might actually leave public shareholders worse off. Thus it is
simply not the case that the parties ex ante would have agreed to private wealth maximization ex post as the criterion for fiduciary duties. 143
140. The desirability of a standard of fairness or good faith ex post is supported by
the way in which fiduciary principles operate as equitable limits on statutes. See supra
text accompanying note 9.
141. See DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
Duke L.J. 879, 885.
142. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale LJ. 698
(1982). These arguments turn on the claim that the rule that permits the private wealth
maximizing outcome ex post also maximizes private wealth ex ante, a result which is
desirable because the transaction will then draw the optimal amount of resources.
143. Thus wealth is maximized ex post, but not ex ante, because shareholders
would not have initially contracted on these terms, and the rule can no longer be defended as the product of a hypothetical ex ante bargain. SeeJ. Coleman, supra note 17,
at 81-105; Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?,
8 Hofstra L. Rev. 671 (1980).
Another defense of rules based on the private wealth maximization criterion is premised on consent. This argument, which traces to Richard Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudiciation, 8 Hofstra L. Rev,
487 (1980), is that a corporate share is like a lottery ticket whose holder has consented
to the wealth maximizing rule: the ticket carries some chance of turning out badly, but
since the price of the ticket reflects the chance of bad outcomes, the holder is compensated ex ante. This confuses knowledge of the possibility of bad outcomes with consent to
the bad outcome itself. If an English professor takes an apartment in a dangerous neighborhood to save on rent-so he can continue to pursue literature rather than go off to
law school-he does not thereby consent to be mugged on the corner.
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The usual response in the corporate law literature to this objection
is that since the parties are diversified (or may diversify), they will be
winners as often as losers from any fiduciary duty rule and therefore
would (ex ante) choose the ex post wealth maximizing rule; that is, ex
post all parties will in fact be better off.14 4 This works only if parties
could have diversified with respect to the risk in question. In the usual
fiduciary case, however, where the conflict is between shareholders and
managers, public shareholders face an impossible diversification problem. In these cases, the risk relates to management's opportunism in

the running of the corporation's affairs. A party is diversified with respect to that risk only if her portfolio contains the right amount of the

managers' outcomes,1 4 5 and of course only a few shareholders can possibly be managers.
Thus a rule that conceives of the hypothetical ex ante bargain
based on private wealth maximization ex post will systematically distribute against shareholders: A fiduciary duty rule that does not attend
to the consequences ex post will simply transfer wealth from one party
144. The classic expression of this case for fiduciary duty rules is Easterbrook &
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, supra note 142, at 703-15. Easterbrook and
Fischel ("E&F") argue that an unequal sharing rule makes gains-producing transactions
more likely, because it gives greater incentives to controlling parties to sell to an acquiror-that is, that such a rule is private wealth maximizing ex post. Id. at 708-11.
The properly diversified investor would prefer such a rule because she is likely to be "on
the winning side of some transactions and the losing side of others," id. at 712, and if
the effect of the rule is to promote gains, the expected return on the portfolio will be
higher. Thus a fiduciary duty rule of unequal gain sharing emerges from the hypothetical ex ante bargain.
Apart from other possible objections, see, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note
25, at 830-33 (stock market efficiency depends upon investors who search for mispriced
securities rather than diversify), this argument works only if the shareholder is properly
diversified against the risk in question. All other things being equal, this would mean an
equal chance of being on the winning side. In E&F's own example, this seems implausible. The likely beneficiaries of an unequal gain sharing rule will be the insiders, whose
consent to the transaction is purchased through the higher payout. This favored group
is comprised largely of members of the founding families of firms and top corporate
managers. It thus seems highly improbable that public shareholders would equally
share the benefits of an unequal gain sharing rule. Similar objections are raised by
Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1072, 1086-89, 1099-1100 (1983); Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 745, 748-52 (1984).
The example is beguiling, however, because public shareholders will benefit from
an unequal gain sharing rule some of the time, as where the controlling shareholder
happens to be a public corporation. This makes their case for private wealth maximization as a criterion seem plausible. In the more traditional fiduciary duty case, where the
conflict is not between shareholder groups but between managers and shareholders, the
diversification argument breaks down immediately.
145. The fact that managers of only some firms in the investors' portfolio exploit
public shareholders does not mean that the investor is adequately diversified against this
risk. The managers' temptation to behave opportunistically is systematic; a rule that
increases the temptation adds to that systematic risk.
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to the other. And because fiduciary duty rules exist in large measure to
protect shareholders from risks against which they cannot diversify, the
ex post private wealth maximization criterion, which depends on diversification, is unsatisfactory. The criterion that should emerge from the
hypothetical ex ante bargain 146 is, instead, a standard of fairness ex
post that embraces the traditional concerns of fiduciary duty doctrine,
particularly abuse of positional advantages.' 4 7 Such a criterion is obviously not self-defining, but at least the argument about the rule of deci148
sion in a particular case is on the proper plane.
Once it is established that the content of fiduciary duties is appropriately supplied by the criterion of fairness ex post, it becomes clear
146. Invoking a hypothetical ex ante agreement as a means for generating a legal
decision rule is problematic because it provides a means for the interpreter to smuggle
in her own view of what values are best in the situation. By hypothesis, there is no actual
consent to the decision rule; the argument, at best, is that a particular rule is rational in
the circumstances and that the parties would therefore have agreed to it. The text argues that ex post "efficiency" is not rational in these circumstances, but that "fairness"
is rational. Indeed, one version of the argument is that the criterion of ex post fairness
is in fact ex ante private wealth maximizing. Alternatively, the text takes an interpretive
strategy: given my objection to uncompensated distributions in corporate institutions,
the way to make the parties' hypothetical bargain over fiduciary duties the best it can be
is through a rule of ex post fairness. See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire 45-86, 228-38
(1986). This interpretivist argument for fairness is supported by the phenomenology of
contracting, in which parties often choose "fair" outcomes rather than maximizing their
immediate gains. See R. Frank, Passions Within Reason 163-77 (1988) (developing theoretical and experimental cases); Hoffman & Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness:
An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14J. Legal
Stud. 259, 283 (1985). Such behavior can of course be attributed to cooperative strategies that are efficient over the long run. See Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in LongTerm Contracts, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 2005, 2040-42 (1987).
The difficulties in extracting a noncontroversial decisional rule from the hypothetical bargain may lead to skepticism about the effort to establish contractarian grounds for
fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 3, at 60-62; Davis, supra note 59, at 16-18;
DeMott, supra note 141, at 887-88; see alsoJ. Gordon, supra note 79, at I (questioning
whether fiduciary duties can survive in an atmosphere of market-induced self-interested
behavior).
147. See Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. Toronto LJ. 1, 4 (1975).
148. The principle of ex post fairness in application should look to two questions:
whether shareholders as a group are better off now (which includes the future, appropriately discounted) as a result of the change and whether unanticipated gains (or losses)
can be equitably shared between insiders and public shareholders where there is a conflict. This kind of analysis has been at work in the legislative decision to permit prospective opting out of duty of care damage actions, where the argument was that shareholder
welfare would be increased by a rule that freed directors from the threat of personal
liability. Similarly, the way courts address the problems arising from poison pills should
attend to the question of whether shareholders, in light of the present facts about the
market in corporate control, will be better off now because of a particular rule of law.
Furthermore, the validity of golden parachute agreements, and perhaps the appropriate
level of management compensation in a leveraged buyout, can perhaps best be looked at
as a question of the equitable sharing of unanticipated gains in circumstances where the
chance for shareholder opportunism may be high. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 105 (1986).
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why opting out of fiduciary duties should be restrained. In the circumstances that fiduciary duties govern, why would shareholders want to
opt out of a fairness standard? It would be irrational for shareholders
to waive or modify substantially the directors' duty of loyalty, for example, and would suggest informational or other defects in the bargaining

process, or, more likely, opportunistic midstream changes. Mandatory
rules protect against these problems while leaving open the possibility
of legislative innovation. 149
CONCLUSION

There are two important decisionmakers who determine the scope
of mandatory law. First are the courts. In construing statutory rules,
courts expand or narrow their scope; and except for limited legislative
tinkering, courts generate and articulate fiduciary duty rules. The second important decisionmaker is the legislature. How should these
decisionmakers respond to requests based on a contractarian view of
corporate law? Since fiduciary duties should be mandatory, subject to
legislative revision, courts should reject efforts to opt out of fiduciary
duties through charter amendment. At the same time, courts should be
receptive to specific contractual arrangements covering matters that
could be addressed through fiduciary duty rules if the parties had remained silent150
How should the legislature respond? As a first matter, it should
reject proposals to make the corporate law entirely enabling.
Mandatory rules serve important purposes. They are also part of the
bargain on which shareholders have relied so that their wholesale abandonment would massively shift wealth to insiders. Secondly, in evaluat149. My view is not, however, that every contractual agreement that arguably
trenches on a fiduciary duty matter is impermissible opting out. Since fiduciary duties
govern insiders' discretion in unforeseeable contingencies, it follows that where parties
have contracted over a specific contingency, such matters need not be covered by a fiduciary duty standard. For example, if the original charter specifies that an inside director
of a biotechnology concern may capture the profits from her weekend work on gamma
interferon in her private lab, this ought not to be regarded as opting out of a fiduciary
standard, the duty of loyalty, but rather part of the economic bargain with the insider.
By contrast, a charter that abrogates the corporate opportunity doctrine altogether does
attempt to opt out of the mandatory fiduciary duty term. The value of future opportunities cannot be assessed and the circumstances in which they might be pursued cannot be
forecast. As a practical matter, most of the specific.contracting that should not be regarded as an opting out of fiduciary duties will occur in the context of the close corporation, as a special element of compensation or some special division of firm profits among
the participants. See generally Coffee, supra note 127, at 1658-64; see also Jordan v.
Duff and Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that employeestockholder obligated to sell his stock upon leaving close corporation may agree that, as
part of the economic relationship governing disposition of the stock, the firm has no
obligation to disclose to him pending merger negotiations prior to his departure decision), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
150. See supra note 149.
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ing proposals to make a particular term optional, the legislature should
assume that the insiders will use the opt-out right in the manner most
favorable to them and ask whether, nevertheless, public shareholders
are better off on average. This question includes the issue of whether
the change will impose costs insofar as it makes the legislature seem a
less reliable guarantor or, pointing in a different direction, whether it
reassures investors that ill-fitting mandatory rules will be appropriately
revised.
Finally, with regard to requests to substitute a mandatory term or
add a mandatory term, as in the case of antitakeover legislation, the
legislature, in addition to resolving the shareholder welfare question,
should always attach a shareholder opt-in requirement. Even if there is
an apparent crisis to which the law is responding, as in the directors'
and officers' liability case, shareholders should be given an immediate
opt-out right and a shareholder opt-in vote should be required at the
next annual meeting. Mandatory rules are one bulwark against opportunism, but when they change, a double-barreled procedure of legislative revision and shareholder approval offers the greatest protection.

